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ARTICLES
BESPEAKING JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF INDIGENT
DEFENSE IN MONTANA
James Park Taylor*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the Montana Legislature enacted the Montana Pub-
lic Defender Act (the Act),1 groundbreaking legislation that put
Montana in the forefront of a nationwide movement to reform in-
digent defense. The Act comprehensively altered how indigent de-
fense services are provided in every state court in Montana; no
other state has ever enacted an indigent defense system of such
breadth and scope. The Act went into effect in 2006, 142 years
after Montana became a territory.
The history of indigent criminal defense in Montana over
those 142 years is not one story, but many. It is the story of statu-
tory and constitutional provisions and the case law that developed
construing those provisions; it is the story of the systems we have
developed to implement our indigent defense policies; and it is the
human story of how we treat those accused of a crime. This Arti-
cle will tell part of all of these stories, offering a history of how
Montana has provided counsel to indigent adults accused of
* Visiting clinical supervisor at The University of Montana School of Law. The author is a past
president of the Montana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and currently serves as Chairman
of the Montana Public Defender Commission.
1. Ch. 449, 2005 Mont. Laws 1564-1632.
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crimes, analyzing the new Montana Public Defender Act, and
identifying unresolved indigent defense issues.2
II. CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, AND CASE LAW
A. Montana Law
Montana became a territory on May 26, 1864. 3 Until Decem-
ber 12, 1864, Montana functioned under the Organic Act and the
Idaho Territorial Statutes.4 Montana's Organic Act did not ad-
dress the right to counsel except to state "[tlhat the constitution
and all laws of the United States, which are not locally inapplica-
ble, shall have the same force and effect within the said Territory
of Montana as elsewhere within the United States."5
The first Montana Territorial Legislature met in Bannack be-
ginning on December 12, 1864, and enacted a Penal Code. An in-
digent accused person arrested in Montana in 1865 and charged
with a felony crime was entitled to counsel at the public's expense,
even though the U.S. Constitution did not require a state or terri-
tory to appoint counsel for the indigent defendant and even
2. The history of juvenile defense in Montana deserves separate treatment, as does
the history of the defense of those involuntarily committed.
3. The Organic Act, Pub. L. No. 38-95, § 1, 13 Stat. 85, 86 (1864).
4. Jesse B. Roote, The Courts and Lawyers of Montana, in Helen Fitzgerald Sanders,
A History of Montana vol. 1, 579, 582 (Lewis Pubig. Co. 1913). Prior to the enactment of
Montana's Organic Act there had been both criminal and civil trials in Montana. The first
criminal trial occurred over two hundred years ago in what is now Missoula County, when
the Lewis and Clark expedition held a trial by military tribunal. A soldier accompanying
them was charged with insubordination, "found guilty and whipped." Id. at 584. The first
civil trial also took place in Missoula County.
The first lawsuit ever commenced in Missoula County, or in fact in Montana, was
commenced and tried at Hell's Gate, in the month of March 1862, before Henry
Brooks, justice of the peace. The proceedings were under the laws of the Washing-
ton Territory. A Frenchman called "Tin Cup Joe"-other name forgotten-accused
Baron O'Keefe with beating one of his horses with a fork handle and then pushing
him into a hole, thereby causing his death, and claimed damages in the sum of
$40, and sued O'Keefe to recover that amount. The place of trial was in Bolte's
saloon. A jury of six was empanelled and sworn to try the cause.... As the trial
progressed the proceedings became less harmonious until it ultimately culminated
in a lot of unpleasantness between the defendant and the writer, who was acting
as attorney for the plaintiff. During the unpleasantness the friends of the respec-
tive parties lent a hand, and it was far from being a select or private affair. While
the unpleasantness was in progress the court and a portion of the jury had fled for
dear life, and when harmony was restored they were nowhere to be found. After
considerable search the court and the jury were captured and the trial proceeded.
Id. (quoting Frank H. Woody, A History of Missoula County and City 4 (W.E. Ellsworth ed.,
Democrat-Messenger 1877)). The jury held for the plaintiff. Id.
5. 13 Stat. at 86.
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though Montana would not have a constitution for another
twenty-five years.
A defendant going to court in 1865 would have had the benefit
of section 132 of the Penal Code:
If any person about to be arraigned upon an indictment for a felony,
be without counsel to conduct his defence, and he be unable to em-
ploy any, it shall be the duty of the court to assign him counsel, at
his request, not exceeding two, who shall have free access to the
prisoner, at all reasonable hours.6
The accused was allowed to take depositions in the same manner
as in civil cases in the event that a witness would be unavailable
at trial. 7 Change of venue was allowed if "the prosecutor has an
undue influence over the minds of the inhabitants of the county
where the indictment or information shall be pending" among
other reasons.8 The accused was allowed twice the number of
challenges during voir dire as was the prosecution. 9 If the prose-
cutor sought an indictment by grand jury, but "not a true bill" was
returned on a misdemeanor charge, the grand jury had the option
of requiring that the prosecutor pay the costs of the proceedings. 10
The prosecutor also had to pay costs if he brought a misdemeanor
prosecution that was later found by the magistrate not to be sup-
ported by probable cause."' Finally, if the accused was acquitted
at a jury trial, the jury then met to decide whether the costs of the
trial would be borne by the county or paid directly by the prosecu-
tor. 12
After the First Territorial Legislature met, Montana's Terri-
torial statutes continued to require the appointment of counsel for
the accused in felony prosecutions. Territorial statutes relating to
indigent defense can be broken down into several parts. There
were statutes designed to enumerate the rights of the accused, 13
statutes designed to ensure the accused was made aware of his
right to counsel, 14 statutes designed to ensure that counsel was
6. 1864 Laws of Mont. Territory 237.
7. Id. at 238.
8. Id. 238-39.
9. Id. at 240.
10. Id. at 255-56.
11. Id. at 256.
12. 1864 Laws of Mont. Territory 256.
13. 1872 Laws of Mont. Territory 204.
14. Id.
2007 365
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appointed for the indigent accused, 15 and eventually statutes to
determine compensation for counsel. 16
In 1871, Montana's Seventh Legislative Session enacted the
Criminal Practice Act 17 that again provided for counsel at public
expense for those accused of serious crimes.
If any person about to be arraigned upon an indictment for felony,
be without counsel to conduct his defence, and he be unable to em-
ploy any, it shall be the duty of the court to assign him counsel, at
his request, not exceeding two, who shall have free access to the
prisoner, at all reasonable hours.' 8
During preliminary examination, a magistrate was required to in-
form the accused of his right to the assistance of counsel, to rea-
sonable time to obtain counsel, and to the assistance of court-ap-
pointed counsel if he was without funds to hire an attorney.19 The
right to counsel was an enumerated right of the accused. 20 The
Territorial Legislature reenacted these statutes without change in
1879 and 1887.21
In 1881, the Territorial Legislature adopted the first statute
relating to the compensation of court-appointed counsel. 22 Coun-
sel was entitled to reasonable payment for his services by the
county, "not to exceed in any capital case the sum of fifty dollars;
in other cases of felony a sum not exceeding twenty-five dollars;
and in other cases a sum not exceeding ten dollars." 23 The Terri-
torial Legislature also reenacted this statute without change in
1887.24 The amount of compensation was left unchanged by the
Territorial Legislature in 1895;25 however, the Legislature in-
creased the maximum fees in 1903 to $100 for a capital case, $50
15. Id. at 220.
16. 1881 Laws of Mont. Territory 12.
17. See Andrew P. Morriss, "This State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws'--Lessons from
One Hundred Years of Codification in Montana, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 359 (1995) (discussing the
trials and tribulations of the Montana Territorial Legislature and its enactment and reen-
actment of statutes).
18. 1872 Laws of Mont. Territory 220.
19. Id. at 204, 220. The law required magistrates to appoint counsel for the indigent,
such as at a preliminary examination. The law also required appointment of counsel for
individuals facing arraignment on felony charges. Id.
20. Id. at 190.
21. Id. at 220 (reenacted by 1879 Laws of Mont. Territory 402; 1887 Laws of Mont.
Territory 440); 1871 Laws of Mont. Territory 204 (reenacted by 1879 Laws of Mont. Terri-
tory 383; 1887 Laws of Mont. Territory 421); 1871 Laws of Mont. Territory 190 (reenacted
by 1879 Laws of Mont. Territory 365; 1887 Laws of Mont. Territory 404).
22. 1881 Laws of Mont. Territory 12-13.
23. Id.
24. 1887 Laws of Mont. Territory 441.
25. Codes & Stats. Mont. § 1892 (1895).
Vol. 68366
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for a felony, and $25 for all other cases.26 These statutory maxi-
mums remained the law of the land for another forty-six years,
until the Montana Legislature removed the dollar limitations in
1949.27
The Territory of Montana first attempted to adopt a constitu-
tion in 1866. No one knows where that document went, nor do we
know its contents.28 Another unsuccessful attempt to adopt a
Montana constitution occurred in 1884.29 The text of the proposed
1884 Constitution included a constitutional provision guarantee-
ing the right to counsel: Article I, section 16 provided "[tihat in
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel. .... ,,30
Montana eventually adopted a constitution in 1889. The 1889
Constitution included the same "right to counsel" language found
in the proposed 1884 Constitution, with the addition of one word,
"all": "That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel .... ,31
There was very little debate in the 1889 Constitutional Conven-
tion directly about the right to counsel; however, the matter was
discussed in a debate about the use of depositions in criminal
cases. Delegate Joseph K. Toole of Helena, quoting Judge Frank
H. Woody, had this to say:
How often shall the accused have counsel, and where? If he once
have counsel, is the constitution satisfied? If he has counsel before
the examining court, may counsel be denied him before the jury? If
once before a jury he have counsel, may he be deprived of counsel on
the second trial? How often may the accused have the right of trial
by jury, [sic] If once a jury be impaneled in his case, is the constitu-
tional guaranty at an end? May he be denied that tribunal after-
wards? If the jury bring no verdict and are discharged, or if the
verdict be set aside, may that constitutional "bulwark" be from that
time abandoned as having done its office, and the State proceed to
judgment by a simpler and more summary process? How often shall
the accused have the right to compulsory process to force the attend-
26. Ch. 33, 1903 Mont. Laws 46-47.
27. Rev. Code Mont. § 9189 (1907).
28. Larry M. Elison & Fritz Snyder, The Montana State Constitution: A Reference
Guide 2 (Greenwood Press 2001).
29. Id. at 2-3.
30. Mont. Const. art. I, § 16 (1884) (not ratified). Of course, the Preamble also acknowl-
edged, "the goodness of the Great Legislator of the Universe." Id. at Preamble.
31. Constitutional Convention of 1889 at 167, 181, 254 (State Publg. Co. 1921) (empha-
sis added). According to the transcripts of the 1889 Convention, the amendment was of-
fered by Delegate Joseph K. Toole, an attorney from Helena, so that "it will conform to the
language used in the amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 167.
2007 367
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ance of his witnesses? May the process be denied him if once in-
voked? These questions answer themselves. No power in the Gov-
ernment can rob him of counsel in a "criminal prosecution" at any
one of a hundred trials of the same cause. The jury must come a
hundred times; if there be as many trials; and in all of them the
compulsory process must go for his witnesses; and at every trial the
witnesses against him must meet him "face to face", that he may
look for the hundredth time upon the witness while he swears, and
every jury may see the manner of the swearing.3 2
Some minor stylistic changes were made to the right to coun-
sel statutes by the 1895 Territorial Legislature, 33 and additional
language was added to bolster the rights of the accused. If the
accused was arrested and unable to inform his counsel, the court
had to order a local peace officer to immediately take a message to
counsel for the accused. 34 The right to have counsel notified by a
peace officer continued until its repeal in 1967 with the enactment
of the new Criminal Procedure Code.35 Montana's right to counsel
statutes were reenacted without change in 1907, 1921, 1935, and
1947.36
The first significant revision of Montana's right to counsel
statutes occurred in 1967, with the adoption of the Criminal Pro-
cedure Code.37 This Code was a product of the Montana Criminal
Law Commission, created by the 1963 Legislature, and chaired by
Associate Justice Wesley Castles of the Montana Supreme
Court.38
The 1967 Code attempted to comprehensively address the is-
sue of the right to counsel. The 1967 Code required that a defen-
dant charged with a felony be informed of his right to counsel at
his initial appearance instead of at arraignment as had been the
practice since the Bannack Code of 1864. The 1967 Code required
at initial appearance that a magistrate inform the accused of not
32. Id. at 257.
33. Codes & Stats. Mont. § 1335, at 943, § 1670, at 978, § 1891, at 1011 (1895).
34. Id. § 1671, at 978.
35. Rev. Code Mont. § 9078 (1907); Rev. Code Mont. § 11774 (1921); Rev. Code Mont.
§ 11774 (1935); Rev. Code Mont. § 94-6102 (1947).
36. Right to Counsel: Rev. Code Mont. § 8915 (1907); Rev. Code Mont. § 11611 (1921);
Rev. Code Mont. § 11611 (1935); Rev Code Mont. § 94-4806 (1947). Magistrate to inform
accused of right to counsel: Rev. Code Mont. § 9077 (1907); Rev. Code Mont. § 11773 (1921);
Rev. Code Mont. § 11773 (1935); Rev. Code Mont. § 94-6101 (1947). Right to court-ap-
pointed counsel for the indigent: Rev. Code Mont. § 9188 (1907); Rev. Code Mont. § 11886
(1921); Rev. Code Mont. § 11886 (1935); Rev. Code Mont. § 94-6512 (1947).
37. Ch. 196, 1967 Mont. Laws 353.
38. 1963 Mont. Laws 202; Mont. Crim. L. Commn., Rec. Series 237 (1957-1973).
368 Vol. 68
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 68 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol68/iss2/8
2007 INDIGENT DEFENSE IN MONTANA 369
only his right to counsel, 39 but also of his right to court-appointed
counsel if charged with a felony. 40 The indigent accused was told
that he had a right to court-appointed counsel; however, it was
only a court of record that had statutory authority to appoint
counsel. 41 The idea behind requiring the appointment of counsel
by a court of record was to ensure both that competent counsel
was appointed and that counsel was adequately compensated. 42
At the time the 1967 Code was adopted, neither the U.S. Su-
preme Court nor the Montana Supreme Court required that coun-
sel be appointed for misdemeanor offenses. 43 The 1967 Code al-
lowed defendants to waive counsel, except for persons under the
age of eighteen charged with a felony.44 Once counsel was ap-
pointed, the appointment continued through direct appeal. 45 The
1967 Code required that court-appointed counsel be paid "such
sum as a district court or justice of the state supreme court certi-
fies to be a reasonable compensation therefore and shall be reim-
bursed for reasonable costs incurred in the criminal proceeding." 46
Payment was made by the county where the prosecution took
place. 47 The 1967 Code gave courts of record discretionary author-
39. Rev. Code Mont. § 95-902(b) (1967).
40. Id. at -902(c).
41. Rev. Code Mont. § 95-1001 (1947). The U.S. Supreme Court had already held that
the indigent accused had the right to counsel at a preliminary examination. White v. Md.,
373 U.S. 59 (1963). Montana's new statute in 1967 did not keep pace with the state of
constitutional law. See Sam E. Haddon, Preliminary Hearing Is a Critical Stage of the
Proceeding at which the Indigent Defendant Is Required to Have the Assistance of Counsel,
25 Mont. L. Rev. 174 (1963).
42. Comments of Charles F. Moses, Feb. 5, 1965, Mont. Crim. L. Commn., Rec. Series
237 (1957-1973).
43. Chapter 196, 1967 Montana Laws 379 provided discretionary authority for a court
to appoint counsel "in the interests of justice" for those charged with misdemeanors. Any
court of record had similar discretionary authority to appoint counsel in a post-conviction
matter. Id. at 380.
44. Id. at 379.
45. Id. at 380.
46. Id.
47. Id. The Legislature shifted responsibility for the costs of paying court-appointed
counsel quite often. The 1973 Legislature made exceptions for proceedings involving only
city ordinance violations, requiring the city to pay for those public defender expenses. Ch.
186, 1973 Mont. Laws 329. The 1974 Legislature made another exception for arrests made
by fish and game officers and agents of the Montana Department of Justice, requiring those
agencies to pay for related public defender expenses. Ch. 15, 1974 Mont. Laws 16. The
1985 Legislature made the general rule that the costs of court-appointed counsel went ei-
ther to the county bringing the prosecution, or the Montana Department of Commerce, and
modified the other exceptions. Ch. 680, 1985 Mont. Laws 1505-10. The 1991 Legislature
deleted the reference to the Department of Commerce, and replaced it with a reference to
the State. Ch. 704, 1991 Mont. Laws 2509. The 1993 Legislature removed the reference to
the district court, allowing a justice of the peace, city court judge, or municipal court judge
7
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ity to appoint counsel for any defendant in a post-conviction pro-
ceeding who was unable to retain counsel.48 Finally, the 1967
Code authorized counties to establish a public defender office and
to staff it with a "salaried public defender and such assistant pub-
lic defenders as may be necessary to satisfy the legal requirements
in providing counsel for defendants unable to employ counsel."49
Any county that took advantage of this provision also got to pay
for the new office. Not surprisingly it was almost twenty years
after the 1967 Code until the first full-time public defender office
was established.50
Montana's 1972 Constitution made no substantive changes to
the provisions governing the right to counsel. Article II, section 24
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel." At the 1972
Constitutional Convention, only one proposal on the right to coun-
sel came out of the Bill of Rights Committee, 51 and that proposal
was to readopt the provisions of the 1889 Constitution. 52 The Bill
of Rights Committee's comments were brief.
The committee voted unanimously to retain the former Article II,
Section 16 unchanged. The committee felt it was an admirable
statement of the fundamental procedural rights of an accused. No
delegate proposals were received on this provision.5 3
to also have the authority to certify the reasonableness of a fee. Ch. 262, 1993 Mont. Laws
709.
48. Ch. 196, 1967 Mont. Laws 380. An earlier draft of this statute gave the same au-
thority to a court of record "if the requesting crook desires counsel and is unable to employ
counsel." Mont. Crim. L. Commn., Rec. Series 237 (1957-1973) (emphasis added).
49. Ch. 196, 1967 Mont. Laws 3-80.
50. The 1985 Legislature shifted part of the costs of a county public defender office to
the state as part of the state assumption of district court costs. Ch. 680, 1985 Mont. Laws
1505, 1509. The 2001 and 2003 Legislatures made similar changes. Ch. 585, 2001 Mont.
Laws 3063; Ch. 583, 2003 Mont. Laws 2442. The 2005 Legislature repealed the authority
for counties to establish public defender offices with the enactment of the Public Defender
Act, Ch. 449, 2005 Mont. Laws 1564. At the time the statewide public defender system was
enacted in 2005, there were six county public defender systems in Montana: Missoula
County, Lewis and Clark County, Gallatin County, Yellowstone County, Cascade County,
and Deer Lodge County.
51. Delegate proposal 18, submitted by Delegates Jerome J. Cate, Bob Campbell, and
Richard J. Champoux, also discussed the right to counsel. Montana Constitutional Conven-
tion, 1971-1972 vol. 1, 105 (Mary Worden et al. eds., Mont. Legis. 1979). Delegate proposal
18 would have significantly expanded the right to counsel for indigent Montanans: "Right
to Counsel. An indigent person shall have the right to counsel in administrative or court
proceedings in which the State, or any subdivision thereof, is an adverse party." Id. The
proposal died in the Bill of Rights Committee on a vote of 11-0. Id. at vol. 2, 647, 658-59.
52. Id. at 641.
53. Id.
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 68 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol68/iss2/8
INDIGENT DEFENSE IN MONTANA
There was virtually no floor debate over the right to counsel at the
1972 Constitutional Convention. 54
It was 1981 before the next significant changes occurred to
Montana's right to counsel statutes. The 1981 Legislature en-
acted a system requiring indigent defendants to repay the costs of
court-appointed counsel.55 This statute excluded consideration of
the assets of friends and relatives of the accused, and considera-
tion of whether the accused had sufficient resources to post bond.
The standard was whether he was "financially unable to obtain
representation without substantial hardship in providing necessi-
ties to himself or his family."56 The accused was required to sub-
mit a financial statement, subject to the penalties of false swear-
ing for any misstatements. 57
If the accused was convicted, the sentencing court had discre-
tion to require that he repay the costs of his appointed counsel.
The compensation and costs had to be reasonable, and the defen-
dant had to be able to pay the costs. 58 The accused could not be
charged with "expenses inherent in providing a constitutionally
guaranteed jury trial or expenditures in connection with the main-
tenance and operation of government agencies that must be made
by the public irrespective of specific violations of the law."5 9 The
defendant had the right to petition the court to forego repayment
of fees and costs as long as he was not in "contumacious" default.6
0
A failure to repay attorney fees and costs could subject the defen-
dant to proceedings for civil contempt.6 1 It could also cause a rev-
ocation of a suspended or deferred sentence.6 2
The 1985 Legislature amended the statute to require that any
payments received from a defendant for attorney fees and costs be
disbursed to the entity that initially incurred the costs of provid-
ing the attorney. 63 The 1987 Legislature further amended the
statute, and required that a minor charged with a crime, and his
54. Montana Constitutional Convention, 1971-1972 at vol. 5, 1776.
55. Ch. 415, 1981 Mont. Laws 721.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 722.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Ch. 415, 1981 Mont. Laws 722.
62. Id. at 723.
63. Ch. 180, 1985 Mont. Laws 1509 (amending Mont. Code Ann. § 46-8-114 (1983)).
2007 371
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parents, had to submit verified financial statements demonstrat-
ing their collective inability to retain counsel. 64
1991 again brought widespread change to Montana's statu-
tory scheme to implement the right to counsel. The 1991 Legisla-
ture made a number of stylistic and substantive changes. Until
1991, counsel had to be appointed for an indigent individual
charged with a felony. This was somewhat inconsistent with fed-
eral case law, as the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled in 1972 that
counsel was to be provided for any indigent person charged with a
felony or misdemeanor punishable by jail time.65 The 1991 Legis-
lature expanded the statutory right to counsel to extend to any
indigent individual accused of any crime, as long as the court re-
tained the possibility of imprisonment as a sentencing option.66
The 1991 Legislature allowed persons under the age of eigh-
teen to waive counsel. 67 The new language stated that the right to
counsel could be waived, provided the court "ascertain[] that the
waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently."68
The 1991 Legislature also codified the U.S. Supreme Court's
Anders v. California69 decision regarding the duty of a court-ap-
pointed attorney who wants to withdraw from an appeal. 70 The
statute was again amended in 2003 to further detail counsel's
duty under those circumstances. 71
The 1991 Legislature made the accused's financial eligibility
statement inadmissible in all civil and criminal matters, except
for impeachment purposes or in a subsequent case for perjury or
false swearing. 72 The 1991 Legislature repealed language stating
that a defendant could not be charged with the costs of providing a
constitutionally required jury trial or costs of incarceration. 73
The 1991 Legislature also created the first criminal defense
office with statewide impact: the Office of the Appellate De-
fender. 74 The Office of the Appellate Defender was designed to
assume responsibility for petitions for post-conviction relief for in-
64. Ch. 479, 1987 Mont. Laws 1181-82.
65. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
66. Ch. 800, 1991 Mont. Laws 3035.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Anders v. Cal., 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
70. Id. at 744; Mont. Code Ann. § 46-8-103 (2001).
71. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-8-103 (2003).
72. Ch. 800, 1991 Mont. Laws 3035.
73. Id. at 3036.
74. Id. at 2891.
372 Vol. 68
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digent individuals alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The
office was supervised by the Appellate Defender Commission. 75
The Governor appointed the commission's five members, and
"charged [them] with developing a system of indigent appellate
defense services, proposing minimum standards for all trial and
appellate public defenders, keeping a roster of attorneys eligible
for appointment as trial and appellate defense counsel for indigent
defendants, and establishing the qualifications, duties, and priori-
ties for the appellant defender."76 Although originally designed to
be in existence for only two years, the commission was in existence
for fifteen years, until the 2005 Legislature repealed the Appellate
Defender Act, effective July 1, 2006.7 7
In 2001, as part of the state assumption of district court costs,
the Legislature redirected funds paid by the defendant for his
court-appointed attorney. Instead of going to the entity responsi-
ble for the prosecution, the monies went to the state general
fund.78
The Montana Legislature has provided counsel to indigent
criminal defendants in two other instances: extradition proceed-
ings, and, more recently, in post-conviction relief matters. The
1973 Legislature enacted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act
(UCEA).79 Under the UCEA, any person arrested on an extradi-
tion warrant must be taken "forthwith" before a court of record
and informed of the charge and of his right to "demand and pro-
cure legal councel."80
As part of the Criminal Procedure Code adopted in 1967,
Montana adopted a version of the Uniform Post Conviction Act.81
At that time, however, there was no statutory right to counsel in
post-conviction proceedings. It was not until 1991 that language
was included to require appointed counsel in any case in which a
hearing was necessary, or when "the interests of justice" required
the appointment of counsel and the petitioner qualified as indi-
75. Id. at 2892.
76. Mont. Code Ann. § 2-15-1020 (2005); Admin. R. Mont. 2.1.101 (2001).
77. Ch. 323, 1993 Mont. Laws 991-92 (repealing the termination date of the Appellate
Defender Act); Ch. 449, 2005 Mont. Laws 1564 (repealing the Appellate Defender Act and
transferring those functions into a branch of the Office of the Public Defender).
78. Ch. 257, 2001 Mont. Laws 258; Ch. 585, 2001 Mont. Laws 3081.
79. Ch. 513, 1973 Mont. Laws 1405; Mont. Code Ann. § 46-30-101 to -413 (2005).
80. Ch. 513, 1971 Mont. Laws 1408 (codified as Rev. Code Mont. § 95-3110 (1947); re-
codified as Mont. Code Ann. § 46-30-217(1) (2005)).
81. Ch. 196, 1967 Mont. Laws 379-80.
2007 373
11
Taylor: Indigent Defense in Montana
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2007
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
gent.8 2 In 1997 the statutes were amended again to require the
appointment of counsel for the indigent post-conviction petitioner
if a sentence of death had been imposed, regardless of whether a
hearing was required.8 3 The post-conviction statutes were again
amended in 2005 to reflect the adoption of the new statewide pub-
lic defender system.8 4
B. The Federal Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees
that, "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."8 5 In
the federal system, however, this has not always meant the ac-
cused had a right to counsel paid by the government in a criminal
prosecution. Instead, for almost 180 years, the right to counsel
was considered a "fielder's choice": if the accused could secure and
pay for an attorney, then he had the "right" to counsel.8 6
Even in capital cases, it was not until 1932 that the U.S. Su-
preme Court ruled in Powell v. Alabama8 7 that there was a right
to counsel "in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to em-
ploy counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own de-
fense." Powell, a state prosecution, was not based on the Sixth
Amendment, but was premised on the right to due process. In the
context of the facts of Powell, a fair hearing could not be obtained
without court-appointed counsel.8 8
[W]e are of opinion that, under the circumstances just stated, the
necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of
the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was like-
wise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Whether this would be so in other criminal prosecu-
tions, or under other circumstances, we need not determine. All
that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capi-
tal case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is
82. Ch. 800, 1981 Mont. Laws 3035.
83. Ch. 378, 1997 Mont. Laws 1766-67.
84. Ch. 449, 2005 Mont. Laws 1615-16.
85. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
86. John P. Comer, The Forging of the Federal Indigent Code 196 (Principia Press of
Trinity U. 1966).
87. Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
88. Id. Powell, one of the Scottsboro cases, involved the trials of several African-Ameri-
cans charged with the rape of two white girls. Id. at 51, 49. No trial counsel was appointed
for the Powell defendants until the morning of their one-day trial. Id. at 49. At the conclu-
sion of the trial, the Scottsboro Boys were, predictably, convicted and sentenced to death.
Id. at 57.
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incapable adequately of making his own defense because of igno-
rance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the
court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a nec-
essary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not dis-
charged by an assignment at such a time or under such circum-
stances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation
and trial of the case. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the fun-
damental postulate, already adverted to, "that there are certain im-
mutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government which no member of the Union may disregard." In a
case such as this, whatever may be the rule in other cases, the right
to have counsel appointed, when necessary, is a logical corollary
from the constitutional right to be heard by counsel.8 9
In federal cases, the right to counsel was expanded in 1938
when the Court decided Johnson v. Zerbst.90 In Johnson, the
Court held that indigent defendants in federal court were entitled
to court-appointed counsel in any felony prosecution.91 Johnson
was based on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.92 Six years
after deciding Powell, the Court significantly limited its impact
when it issued Avery v. Alabama.93 In Avery, the defendant was
arrested on March 21, 1938, and charged with capital murder. 94
He had two attorneys appointed for him that morning, and went
to trial three days later on March 24, 1938.9 5 His attorneys moved
for a continuance, alleging that they did not have sufficient time
to prepare for the case: one of the defendant's attorneys was in
trial on March 21, had to attend court on another matter on
March 22, and was unable to meet with his client until March 23,
one day before trial.96 The circuit court made no ruling on the
motion for continuance, and the trial began as scheduled on
March 24.97 The defendant was convicted and sentenced to
death. 98
Distinguishing Powell v. Alabama on its facts, the Court af-
firmed the death sentence, holding that three days to prepare for
89. Id. at 71-72 (citation omitted).
90. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
91. Id. at 468.
92. Id. at 467-68.
93. Avery v. Ala., 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
94. Id. at 447.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 447-48.
97. Id. at 448.
98. Id. at 448-49.
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trial did not create a lack of effective assistance of counsel.99 Pow-
ell did not mandate a particular amount of time to prepare for
trial, only that counsel for the accused cannot be appointed on the
morning of the trial in a complex death penalty case. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court would not reach the same conclusion under
Montana's constitutional and statutory rights to counsel. 100
The U.S. Supreme Court backed even farther away from
Johnson just a few years later in Betts v. Brady.'0 ' Betts, a non-
capital case, made it clear that the Johnson v. Zerbst rationale did
not apply to felony state court proceedings in the absence of excep-
tional factual circumstances such as those found in Powell v. Ala-
bama.l0 2
In 1963, the Court extended defendants' right to court-ap-
pointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment to all state court fel-
ony prosecutions in Gideon v. Wainwright. 10 3 The same year, the
Court decided White v. Maryland.0 4 In White, the Court ruled
that the right to counsel under Gideon attached no later than the
preliminary hearing stage. 0 5
Gideon did not require the appointment of counsel in all
cases, however, only in felony prosecutions. 10 6 A Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel for indigents accused of misdemeanors in
state court was not recognized until Argersinger v. Hamlin in
99. Avery, 308 U.S. at 445-46, 453. Avery has not been overruled. In fact, the U.S.
Supreme Court cited Avery with approval as recently as 1984 in U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 654 n. 9 (1984).
100. In a non-capital case, the Montana Supreme Court reached an entirely different
conclusion on remarkably similar facts. In State v. Blakeslee, the defendant was charged
with statutory rape of his step-daughter. State v. Blakeslee, 306 P.2d 1103, 1104 (Mont.
1957). On March 21, 1957, three days before trial, Blakeslee's retained counsel withdrew
from the case and the court appointed local attorney M.K. Daniels to represent him. Id.
Daniels immediately moved to continue the trial as he had a trial already scheduled for
March 22, 1957. Id. The presiding judge, William Taylor, denied the motion, and the case
proceeded to trial on March 24, resulting in Blakeslee's conviction. Id. at 1103-04. On
appeal, Justice Davis ruled that forcing Blakeslee and his counsel to trial with only three
days to prepare denied Blakeslee the right to counsel under Article III, section 16 of the
Montana Constitution of 1889. Id. at 1104-05. "Mr. Daniels' appointment was made pur-
poseless by compelling him to go to trial on March 24, 1957, and that in fact the defendant
was denied the aid of counsel upon that trial which took up on only the third day after Mr.
Daniels was appointed to defend him." Id. at 1105. The Montana Supreme Court did not
discuss the Avery v. Alabama decision.
101. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
102. Id. at 463-64.
103. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S 335, 342-45 (1963).
104. White v. Md., 373 U.S. 59 (1963). For a discussion of the White decision in Mon-
tana, see Haddon, supra n. 41.
105. White, 373 U.S. at 60.
106. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339.
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1972.107 In 1984, the Court ruled that the right to counsel meant
the right to "effective assistance of counsel" in Strickland v. Wash-
ington*108
Most recently, in 2002, the Supreme Court held in Alabama v.
Shelton10 9 that, in a state misdemeanor prosecution, the indigent
accused was entitled to court-appointed counsel even if the sen-
tence imposed was suspended."10 Up until Shelton, several states,
including Montana,1 1 refused to provide counsel to a defendant in
that situation. 112
III. IDENTIFYING INDIGENT DEFENSE PROBLEMS IN
MONTANA COURTS
The overall state of indigent defense in the U.S. has been one
of high hopes and poor performance. Performance issues are
linked directly to funding issues. When the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Powell v. Alabama,113  Gideon v. Wainwright,114
Argersinger v. Hamlin,115 Ake v. Oklahoma,116 and Alabama v.
Shelton,"1 7 the Court announced its opinions on facets of the right
to counsel for those charged with crimes. The Court did not ad-
dress, however, the source of funding for these attorneys, investi-
gators, expert witnesses, training, support staff, and everything
107. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1972); Contra Scott v. Ill., 440 U.S. 367,
373-74 (1979) (ruling that a state court defendant did not have the right to counsel if the
only possible punishment was a fine).
108. Strickland v. Wash., 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McCann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970)).
109. Ala. v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
110. Id. at 674.
111. State v. Skurdal, 767 P.2d 304, 308 (Mont. 1988) (stating the right to counsel for a
misdemeanor is discretionary with the trial judge).
112. Montana statutes have not kept pace with federal constitutional jurisprudence.
For example, Mont. Code Ann. § 46-8-101(2) (2005) provides that a court only needs to
appoint counsel "[i]f the defendant desires assigned counsel because of financial inability to
retain private counsel and the offense charged is a felony or the offense is a misdemeanor
and incarceration is a sentencing option if the defendant is convicted" (emphasis added).
Shelton requires appointment of counsel even if only a suspended or deferred sentence is
imposed. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 674. The only time counsel is not required is when the sen-
tencing court is going to impose only a fine or other penalties that do not include incarcera-
tion or the prospect of incarceration. Id.
113. Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
114. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
115. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
116. Ake v. Okla., 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
117. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654.
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else necessary to fulfill the promise of Gideon.118 Therein lies the
rub.
Historically, there has been little opposition in Montana's
criminal justice system to the accused being represented by coun-
sel. The issue is, and always has been, who will pay for that rep-
resentation. From the beginning in Montana, the burden was os-
tensibly on the county in which the prosecution took place, but in
reality, much of the burden fell on the private bar. From 1864
until 1903, the maximum fee that an appointed attorney could col-
lect for the defense of a capital crime in state court in Montana
was $50. From 1903 until 1949, the maximum fee appointed de-
fense counsel could charge in a capital case was $100.119
It has been no secret that the quality of indigent defense in
Montana has varied widely from one jurisdiction to another, and
has even varied widely over time within the same jurisdiction.
The first published study of indigent defense in Montana was a
cursory one, prepared in 1965 by the American Bar Association as
part of a study of the indigent systems in all fifty states. 20
Recognizing problems with the system, in 1976 the Montana
Board of Crime Control awarded a grant to the National Center
for Defense Management to prepare the Montana Statewide De-
fender Systems Development Study (NCDM Study). The NCDM
Study was initiated at the behest of the Montana Legal Services
Corporation,' 21 and reviewed the delivery of indigent criminal de-
fense services in five areas, Yellowstone, Missoula, Lake, and
118. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339, 345.
119. Huntington v. Yellowstone Co., 257 P. 1041, 1042-43 (Mont. 1927). The court had
the authority, of course, to appoint more than one attorney on a capital case and pay each
$100 for the defense. Id. at 1043.
120. Lee Silverstein, ABA, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in American State
Courts: A Field Study and Report (ABA 1965). A more detailed discussion of Montana's
indigent defense in the early 1960s was prepared by Professor Larry Elison. Larry M.
Elison, Assigned Counsel in Montana: The Law and the Practice, 26 Mont. L. Rev. 1 (1964).
121. Ltr. from Neil Haight, Pres., Mont. Leg. Svcs. Assoc., to the Mont. Bd. of Crime
Control (July 26, 1976), in Natl. Leg. Aid and Def. Assoc., Montana Statewide Defender
Systems Development Study app. A (Natl. Ctr. Def. Mgt. 1976) [hereinafter NCDM Study].
Fred VanValkenberg, one of the Missoula County contract public defenders and a member
of the Montana Legal Services Association Board of Trustees, was also instrumental in the
preparation of the NCDM Study. Mr. VanValkenberg is now the Missoula County Attor-
ney. Missoula Co. Atty.'s Off., http://www.co.missoula.mt.us/cattorney/ (accessed Mar. 3,
2007).
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Flathead Counties, and the southeastern counties within the Six-
teenth Judicial District.122
Yellowstone County was the largest area studied, with a pop-
ulation of 97,300.123 Indigent defense in Yellowstone County was
conducted at the time by five part-time public defenders. 124 Three
of the attorneys handled all the appointed felony work for a flat
fee of $1,500 each per month, one attorney handled the juvenile
cases for a flat fee of $1,200 per month, and the final attorney
handled all the mental health commitments for a flat fee of $800
per month.1 25 There was no additional compensation for costs or
investigation. 126 No additional fees were paid in the event of a
trial or appeal. 127 In the event of a conflict that could not be han-
dled by the contract attorneys, a private attorney was appointed
at an hourly rate of between $25 and $50.128 The NCDM Study
characterized the local consensus about the Yellowstone County
system as, "[it] works well enough to avoid embarrassing mistakes
or deficiencies but does not meet the standards of private prac-
tice."' 2
9
Flathead County had a system developed by the local district
court judges, also using part-time contract attorneys.1 30 One of
the three attorneys was named chief defender and received an an-
nual salary of $15,000, while the other two were paid $12,000 per
year.' 31 During 1975, their compensation averaged approxi-
mately $11 per hour for time spent on indigent defense work. 132
Some additional monies were also available to them for expenses,
and they received an additional flat sum of $500 in the event of an
appeal.' 33
Indigent defense in the Sixteenth Judicial District in 1976
was done exclusively by appointed attorneys. 34 All private attor-
122. NCDM Study, supra n. 121, at 4. At the time, the Sixteenth Judicial District en-
compassed Carter, Custer, Fallon, Garfield, Powder River, Prairie, and Rosebud Counties.
Rev. Code Mont. § 93-301 (1947).
123. NCDM Study, supra n. 121, at 5.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 5-6
128. Id. at 5.
129. NCDM Study, supra n. 121, at 7.
130. Id. at 8.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 11.
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neys in the district, with the exception of prosecutors, were on the
list.135 The district judges at the time agreed that most of the at-
torneys they appointed had "little or no experience in criminal
law."1 36 The attorneys were very reluctant to take cases since
their practices did not include a significant amount of criminal
law, the appointed cases interfered with their private practice,
and most cases typically involved a fee dispute.137
The NCDM Study identified numerous deficiencies in how
Montana's indigent defense services were delivered, and made the
following recommendations:
* That the Legislature create "The Montana Defender Cor-
poration";
* That the Montana Public Defender Corporation enter into
full-time contracts with attorneys in each of the Districts
for handling cases;
* That a central office be established to handle indigent
criminal appeals and supportive research;
* That one or more specialized trial attorneys be maintained
by the State for complicated cases;
* That a list of available assigned counsel be maintained to
draw from in case of co-defendant conflicts or overload;
" That community support be mobilized by circuit defend-
ers;
* That sufficient support services be provided; and
* That orientation, training and continued legal education
be provided to defenders and panel attorneys. 138
The 1977 Montana Legislature failed to implement any of the
study's recommendations.
The Montana Legislature's Joint Sub-Committee on Judiciary
conducted another study on indigent defense in 1982.139 The 1982
Report considered two alternatives to improve indigent defense
services. 140 The first was to create a statewide public defender
system that divided the entire state into districts, with full-time
135. NCDM Study, supra n. 121, at 11.
136. Id. at 12.
137. Id. at 12-14.
138. Id. at 1.
139. J. Sub-Comm. on Jud., The District Courts, Indigent Defense, and Prosecutorial
Services in Montana: A Report to the Forty-Eighth Legislature (Mont. Leg. Council 1982)
[hereinafter 1982 Report].
140. Id. at 19.
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deputy public defenders in each. 141 The statewide system would
have been overseen by a nine-member public defender commis-
sion. 142 The 1982 Report rejected this option as being too costly to
implement.143
The second option considered in the 1982 Report was to create
the position of "Public Defense Coordinator. " 144 The duties of the
Coordinator would have been to conduct indigent criminal defense
training, to help plan how defense services would be provided in
the future, to act as a clearinghouse for criminal defense informa-
tion, to collect information on indigent defense costs and
caseloads, and to apply for federal grants to advance the cause for
indigent defense in Montana.1 45 The Public Defense Coordinator
program had a projected cost of less than 6% of the cost of a state-
wide system. 46 Senate Bill 5 incorporating the Public Defense
Coordinator option was introduced in the 1983 Legislature by
Senator Joe Mazurek. The bill received a "do not pass" recommen-
dation from the Senate Judiciary Committee, and failed on first
reading.147
In 2003, a legislative effort was made to create a statewide
public defender system with the introduction of Senate Bill 218.148
As drafted, however, the bill only addressed district court criminal
matters, and therefore only a portion of the problem. Both the
local jurisdictions and the larger reform interests wanted a com-
prehensive solution to the ongoing problems with Montana's sys-
tem, and no one could agree on a funding mechanism for the
bill.1 49 The bill ultimately died in committee.150
The landscape changed, however, when the American Civil
Liberties Union's class action civil rights lawsuit gathered steam
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. The 1982 Report estimated the cost of the system for FY 1984 and 1985 to be
$4.4 million. Id.
144. 1982 Report, supra n. 139, at 19.
145. Id. at 19-20.
146. Id. at 20. The Fiscal Note for the proposed bill estimated the cost of the program
over two fiscal years at $248,907. Id.
147. Mont. Sen. J., 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. 70 (1983).
148. Mont. Sen. 218, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2003) (available at http://data.opi.mt.gov/
bills/2003/billhtml/SB0218.htm (accessed Mar. 3, 2007)).
149. L. & Just. Interim Comm., For the Defense: Enacting a Statewide Public Defender
System in Montana: A Report to the 59th Legislature 6 (Dec. 2004) (available at http://
leg.mt.gov/content/publications/committees/interim/2003-2004/law justice/final-report.pdf
[hereinafter LJIC Public Defender Report]).
150. Mont. Sen. 218, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess.
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in Lewis and Clark County. 151 White v. Martz initially named
Governor Martz, the Supreme Court Administrator, the members
of the Appellate Defender Commission, and seven counties as de-
fendants, alleging violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth amend-
ments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as violations of sections 4,
17, and 24 of Article II of the Montana Constitution. 152 The suit
focused on the State's failure to set and enforce standards for indi-
gent defense practice, failure to adequately fund indigent defense,
failure to adequately train indigent defense counsel, failure to set
and monitor caseload standards, and failure to adopt and imple-
ment conflict of interest policies. 153
In the summer of 2004, as part of the White v. Martz litiga-
tion, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA)
undertook a study.154 The NLADA report was prepared at a time
when the national legal community was coming to a stark realiza-
tion about how poorly Montana's indigent defense systems were
working. The report identified numerous deficiencies in the de-
fense system that mirrored the ACLU's allegations in White v.
Martz.155 In addition, the NLADA Report criticized the system for
not being "sufficiently independent and free from undue political
interference. 1 56
The NLADA report focused on the state's failure to comply
with the American Bar Association's (ABA) Ten Principles of a
151. Pl.'s Amend. Gompl. at 1, White v. Martz, 2006 Mont. Dist. Lexis 136 (Mont. 1st
Jud. Dist. Jan. 25, 2006). The lead attorney on the complaint was Ronald F. Waterman, of
the Helena law firm of Gough, Johnson, Shanahan & Waterman, and former student direc-
tor of the Montana Defender Project. Gough, Shanahan, Johnson & Waterman, Ronald F.
Waterman, http://www.gsjw.com/attorneyprofiles/attorney.asp?id=2283 (accessed Mar. 3,
2007).
152. Pl.'s Amend. Compl. at 1-2, White, CDV-2002-133.
153. Id. at 2-4.
154. The Nat. Leg. Aid & Defender Assoc., Expert Report: An Assessment of Indigent
Defense Services in Montana, Submitted in the Case White v. Martz, CDV-2002-133 (Aug.
4, 2004) [hereinafter NLADA Report]. At about the same time a separate report was pre-
pared concerning the delivery of legal representation to juveniles in delinquency proceed-
ings in Montana. This report identified many of the same deficiencies as the NLADA Re-
port in White v. Martz, including inadequate funding and resources for juvenile defenders,
inadequate training of juvenile defenders, and a lack of standards on how defense services
are to be delivered for juveniles in delinquency proceedings. ABA Juv. Just. Ctr., Montana:
An Assessment of Access to Counsel and Quality of Representation in Delinquency Proceed-
ings (Brock Albin et al. eds., Oct. 2003). See also Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The
Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 Hastings L.J. 1031 (2006); Rob-
ert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58
L. & Contemp. Probs. 31 (1995).
155. NLADA Expert Report, supra n. 154, at 1-2.
156. Id. at 1.
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Public Defense Delivery System. These ten principles were
adopted by the ABA as a guideline for how indigent defense ser-
vices should be delivered.157 The ten principles are,
1. "The public defense function, including the selection,
funding and payment of defense counsel is independent"
from other agencies in the criminal justice system and
free from undue political interference. The public de-
fense system should be overseen by a nonpartisan board,
not the judicial system, and public defenders should be
hired on the basis of merit.
2. "Where the caseload is sufficiently high, the public de-
fense delivery system consists of both a public defender
office and the active participation of the private bar."
Since the responsibility to provide defense services rests
with the state, there should be state funding and a state-
wide structure to ensure uniform quality statewide.
3. "Clients are screened for eligibility" and assigned a pub-
lic defender as soon as possible after client's arrest, de-
tention or request for a lawyer, usually within 24 hours.
4. Defense counsel must be allowed adequate time and a
confidential meeting space to meet with the client.
5. Defense counsel's workload is limited to allow for ethi-
cal, quality representation. National standards should
never be exceeded, and limited support staff or a de-
fender's nonrepresentational duties may further reduce
the caseload limits.
6. "Defense counsel's ability, training and experience
match the complexity of the case."
7. "The same attorney continuously represents the client"
through all stages of the proceeding. Effective lawyering
is impossible in an assembly line system of indigent de-
fense.
8. "There is parity between defense counsel and the prose-
cution with respect to resources .... There should be
parity of workload, salaries and other resources (such as
benefits, technology, facilities.., support staff... inves-
tigators and access to forensic services and experts)."
157. ABA, Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System, "Introduction," http://
www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf
(accessed Mar. 3, 2007).
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Further, defense counsel is included and treated as an
equal partner in the criminal justice system.
9. "Defense counsel is provided with and required to attend
continuing legal education."
10. "Defense counsel is supervised and systematically re-
viewed for quality and efficiency according to nationally
and locally adopted performance standards."158
The NLADA report concluded that Montana did not effectively
meet any of the ten principles, citing numerous issues with both
organized and appointed indigent defense systems. 159
In response to the White v. Martz litigation, Attorney General
Mike McGrath signed a stipulation staying the litigation pending
the 2005 Montana Legislative Session. 160 The matter was taken
under study by the Montana Legislature's Law and Justice In-
terim Committee (LJIC).161 The LJIC, and a subcommittee that
focused exclusively on indigent defense, studied the matter over
ten months, and, on September 8, 2004, unanimously recom-
mended that the Legislature adopt a comprehensive statewide
public defender system that incorporated all of the ABA's Ten
Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System. 62
Marking the fortieth anniversary of the Gideon decision, the
ABA also issued a report in 2004 about the state of indigent de-
fense in the United States, entitled Gideon's Broken Promise:
America's Continuing Quest for Equal Justice.163 The ABA Report
made a number of findings about the state of indigent defense ser-
vices:
" Forty years after Gideon v. Wainwright, indigent defense in the
United States remains in a state of crisis, resulting in a system
that lacks fundamental fairness and places poor persons at con-
stant risk of wrongful conviction.
* Funding for indigent defense services is shamefully inadequate.
* Lawyers who provide representation in indigent defense sys-
tems sometimes violate their professional duties by failing to
furnish competent representation.
158. Id. at 1-3.
159. NLADA Report, supra n. 154, at 68 (citations omitted).
160. Id. at 7.
161. LJIC Public Defender Report, supra n. 149 (Sen. Duane Grimes (R-Clancy), LJIC
chair; Rep. John Parker (D-Great Falls), LIC vice-chair; Sheri S. Heffelfinger, LJIC re-
search analyst; Valencia Lane, LJIC staff attorney; and Sen. Daniel McGee (R-Laurel),
chair of the subcommittee on the public defender issue).
162. Id. at pt. 1.
163. ABA, Gideon's Broken Promise: America's Continuing Quest for Equal Justice
(ABA, 2004).
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* Lawyers are not provided in numerous proceedings in which a
right to counsel exists in accordance with the Constitution and/
or state law. Too often, prosecutors seek to obtain waivers of
counsel and guilty pleas from unrepresented accused persons,
while judges accept and sometimes even encourage waivers of
counsel that are not knowing, voluntary, intelligent, and on the
record.
* Judges and elected officials often exercise undue influence over
indigent defense attorneys, threatening the professional inde-
pendence of the defense function.
" Indigent defense systems frequently lack basic oversight and ac-
countability, impairing the provision of uniform, quality ser-
vices.
" Efforts to reform indigent defense systems have been most suc-
cessful when they involve multi-faceted approaches and repre-
sentatives from a broad spectrum of interests.
" The organized bar too often has failed to provide the requisite
leadership in the indigent defense area.
* Model approaches to providing quality indigent defense services
exist in this country, but these models are not adequately
funded and cannot be replicated elsewhere absent sufficient fi-
nancial support.1
64
IV. CRAFTING A RESPONSE
The bill proposed by LJIC was introduced in Montana's 2005
Legislature. 165 Given the scope of the bill, its legislative history is
remarkable. It received a unanimous "do pass" recommendation
from the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 14, 2005.166
On second reading in the Senate, an attempt was made to amend
the bill to require that the new Office of the Public Defender be
located in Butte. The motion failed on a vote of 24-26, but would
return again before the end of the session. 167 The bill then passed
second reading on a unanimous vote and was referred to the Sen-
ate Finance and Claims Committee.
The bill passed the Finance and Claims Committee with some
amendments on a vote of 17-2.168 The full Senate unanimously
approved the amended bill on second reading, and passed it on
third reading on a vote of 48-0.169 After some amendments in the
House, the bill went to a Free Conference Committee, and in the
164. Id. at v.
165. Mont. Sen. 146, 59th Leg (Apr. 28, 2005).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
2007 385
23
Taylor: Indigent Defense in Montana
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2007
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Free Conference Committee the idea resurfaced to mandate that
the Office of the Public Defender be located in Butte. 170 The Free
Conference Committee amended the bill to require the Office to be
located in Butte, and the final bill passed the Senate on a vote of
50-0 and the House on a vote of 89-11.171
The Montana Public Defender Act was enacted in 2005.172
The Act is a radical departure from Montana's past, and is the
most forward-looking piece of indigent defense legislation passed
to-date in the United States. The stated purposes of the Act are to
(1) establish a statewide public defender system to provide effective
assistance of counsel to indigent criminal defendants and other per-
sons in civil cases who are entitled by law to assistance of counsel at
public expense;
(2) ensure that the system is free from undue political interference
and conflicts of interest;
(3) provide that public defender services are delivered by qualified
and competent counsel in a manner that is fair and consistent
throughout the state;
(4) establish a system that utilizes state employees, contracted ser-
vices, or other methods of providing services in a manner that is
responsive to and respective of regional and community needs and
interests; and
(5) ensure that adequate public funding of the statewide public de-
fender system is provided and managed in a fiscally responsible
manner.
173
The Act is comprehensive. It creates a unitary system of indi-
gent defense for all Montana courts: justice courts, city courts,
municipal courts, district courts, and the Montana Supreme
Court. 174 Not only does the system comprehensively cover all
Montana courts, 175 it also covers virtually all areas in which an
attorney may be appointed and is not limited to criminal cases. 176
170. Jennifer McKee, Butte Gets Defender Agency, Helena Indep. Rec. (Apr. 14, 2005)
(available at http://www.helenair.com/articles/2005/04/14/leg agencies/041405_01.txt).
171. Mont. Sen. 146, 59th Leg. (Apr. 28, 2005).
172. Id.
173. Mont. Code Ann. § 47-1-102 (2005).
174. Id. at -104.
175. Montana has 152 lower courts (eighty-one city courts, sixty-six justice courts, and
five municipal courts). Mont. Cts., Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, http://
montanacourts.org/lcourt/default.asp (accessed Feb. 21, 2007). There are fifty-six district
courts located in all fifty-six counties (twenty-two judicial districts with forty-three district
judges). Id. at http://www.montanacourts.org/dcourtdefault.asp. There are also the Mon-
tana Supreme Court and the Sentence Review Division of the Montana Supreme Court. Id.
at http://www.montanacourts.org/supreme/boards/srd.asp.
176. Mont. Code Ann. § 47-1-104(4) provides:
(4) Beginning July 1, 2006, a court may order the office to assign counsel under
this chapter in the following cases:
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The only appointed work not being done by the new Office of the
(a) in cases in which a person is entitled to assistance of counsel at public
expense because of financial inability to retain private counsel, subject to a
determination of indigence pursuant to 47-1-111, as follows:
(i) for a person charged with a felony or charged with a misdemeanor for
which there is a possibility of incarceration, as provided in 46-8-101;
(ii) for a party in a proceeding to determine parentage under the Uni-
form Parentage Act, as provided in 40-6-119;
(iii) for a parent, guardian, or other person with physical or legal custody
of a child or youth in any removal, placement, or termination pro-
ceeding pursuant 41-3-422 and as required under the federal Indian
Child Welfare Act, as provided in 41-3-425;
(iv) for an applicant for sentence review pursuant to Title 46, chapter 18,
part 9;
(v) for a petitioner in a proceeding for postconviction relief, as provided
in 46-21-201;
(vi) for a petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to Title 46,
chapter 22;
(vii) for a parent or guardian in a proceeding for the involuntary commit-
ment of a developmentally disabled person to a residential facility, as
provided in 53-20-112;
(viii) for a respondent in a proceeding for involuntary commitment for a
mental disorder, as provided in 53-21-116;
(ix) for a respondent in a proceeding for the involuntary commitment of a
person for alcoholism, as provided in 53-24-302; and
(x) for a witness in a criminal grand jury proceeding, as provided in 46-4-
304.
(b) in cases in which a person is entitled by law to the assistance of counsel at
public expense regardless of the person's financial ability to retain private
counsel, as follows:
(i) as provided for in 41-3-425;
(ii) for a youth in a proceeding under the Montana Youth Court Act al-
leging a youth is delinquent or in need of intervention, as provided in
41-5-1413, and in a prosecution under the Extended Jurisdiction
Prosecution Act, as provided in 41-5-1607;
(iii) for a juvenile entitled to assigned counsel in a proceeding under the
Interstate Compact on Juveniles, as provided in 41-6-101;
(iv) for a minor who petitions for a waiver of parental notification re-
quirements under the Parental Notice of Abortion Act, as provided in
50-20-212;
(v) for a respondent in a proceeding for the involuntary commitment of a
developmentally disabled person to a residential facility, as provided
in 53-20-112;
(vi) for a minor voluntarily committed to a mental health facility, as pro-
vided in 53-21-112;
(vii) for a person who is the subject of a petition for the appointment of a
guardian or conservator in a proceeding under the provisions of the
Uniform Probate Code in Title 72, chapter 5;
(viii) for a ward when the ward's guardian has filed a petition to require
medical treatment for a mental disorder of the ward, as provided in
72-5-322; and
(c) for an eligible appellant in an appeal of a proceeding listed in this subsec-
tion (4).
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State Public Defender (OSPD) is that public defenders may not be
appointed as special advocates or guardians ad litem either under
the Youth Court Act or in an abuse and neglect proceeding. 177
OSPD is run by the Chief Public Defender, 178 and overseen by
an eleven-member Public Defender Commission. The Governor
appointed the commission members based on specified areas of ex-
pertise and nomination by the State Bar of Montana, the Montana
Supreme Court, the House Speaker, the Senate President, or the
general public.1 79 The commission is charged with approving a
strategic plan for the delivery of indigent defense services, and de-
veloping practice and training standards for public defenders. 180
177. Id. at -104(5)(a). This proscription only applies to full-time public defenders and
not to contract attorneys. Id. at -104(5)(b).
178. Randi Hood was selected by the Public Defender Commission as Montana's first
Chief Public Defender. Mont. Off. St. Pub. Defender, http://publicdefender.mt.gov/
aboutus.asp (accessed Feb. 20, 2007). Ms. Hood, a 1975 graduate of The University of Mon-
tana School of Law, has devoted her professional career as an attorney to indigent defense.
Ms. Hood was named the 2004 Criminal Defense Lawyer of the Year by the Montana Asso-
ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Carolynn Bright, Hood Named State's Top Public
Defender, Helena Indep. Rec. (Mar. 10, 2005) (available at http://www.helenair.com/arti-
cles/2005/10/08/montanatop/a01100805_02.txt).
179. The commission members are
1. James Park Taylor, Chair (Missoula) (Author), appointed July 1, 2005, term ends July 1,
2008. Qualification: attorney nominated by State Bar, experienced in defense of juvenile
delinquency and federal Indian Child Welfare Act.
2. Stephen Nardi, Vice-Chair (Kalispell), (reappointed) appointed July 1, 2006, term ends
July 1, 2009. Qualification: attorney nominated by State Bar, experienced in felony defense
with one year as full-time public defender.
3. Daniel Donovan (Great Falls), appointed July 1, 2005, term ends July 1, 2008. Qualifi-
cation: attorney nominated by the Montana Supreme Court.
4. Mike Sherwood (Missoula), appointed July 1, 2005, term ends July 1, 2007. Qualifica-
tion: attorney nominated by the Montana Supreme Court.
5. Wendy Holton (Helena), appointed July 1, 2005, term ends July 1, 2007. Qualification:
attorney nominated by State Bar, who represents criminal defense lawyers.
6. Doug Kaercher (Havre), (reappointed) appointed July 1, 2006, term ends July 1, 2009.
Qualification: public representative nominated by Senate President. Resigned January 1,
2007, to accept an appointment to the State Tax Appeal Board.
7. Caroline Fleming (Miles City), appointed July 1, 2005, term ends July 1, 2008. Qualifi-
cation: public representative nominated by House Speaker.
8. Tara Veazey (Helena), appointed July 1, 2005, term ends July 1, 2007. Qualification:
member of organization advocating on behalf of indigent persons.
9. Ivan Small (Poplar), appointed July 1, 2006, term ends July 1, 2009. Qualification:
member of organization advocating on behalf of racial minorities.
10. Jennifer Hensley (Butte), appointed July 1, 2005, term ends July 1, 2008. Qualifica-
tion: member of organization advocating on behalf of people with mental illness and devel-
opmental disabilities.
11. Betty Bichsel (Edgar), appointed July 1, 2005, term ends July 1, 2007. Qualification:
employee of organization providing addictive behavior counseling.
Mont. Off. St. Pub. Defender, supra n. 178, at http://publicdefender.mt.gov/members.asp.
180. Mont. Code Ann. § 47-1-105.
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The approved strategic plan separates the State into eleven re-
gions that combine existing judicial districts.""1 The commission
has already adopted the Standards for Counsel Representing Indi-
viduals pursuant to the Montana Public Defender Act (Stan-
dards),18 2 and is currently training its employees and contract at-
torneys on their implementation. The Standards call for parity in
resources and compensation between the defense and prosecu-
tion,183 and are intended to be a guide for full-time public defend-
ers and contract attorneys providing indigent defense services.
They are not intended to establish a specific standard of care for
either a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or a claim for
legal malpractice.18 4 The Standards are derived from numerous
sources. As a baseline, the commission looked to the standards
developed by the Montana's Appellate Defender Commission.
Working from that framework, the commission adopted a number
of standards from those developed by the Georgia Public Defender
Standards Council,18 5 as well as from North Carolina 8 6 and
Iowa.18 7 In addition, the commission drafted and adopted a num-
ber of original standards.
181. The regions break down as follows:
Region 1: The Eleventh, Nineteenth, and Twentieth Judicial Districts
Region 2: The Fourth and Twenty-first Judicial Districts
Region 3: The Eighth and the Ninth Judicial Districts
Region 4: The First and a portion of the Fifth Judicial Districts
Region 5: The Second, Third, and a portion of the Fifth Judicial Districts
Region 6: The Twelfth and the Seventeenth Judicial Districts
Region 7: The Tenth and the Fourteenth Judicial Districts
Region 8: The Sixth and the Eighteenth Judicial Districts
Region 9: The Thirteenth and Twenty-second Judicial Districts
Region 10: The Seventh and the Fifteenth Judicial Districts
Region 11: The Sixteenth Judicial District
The only regions that split judicial districts are Regions 4 and 5. Region 4 includes the
First Judicial District and part of the Fifth Judicial District. Region 5 includes the Second
and Third Judicial Districts, and a portion of the Fifth Judicial District. Regions were
divided this way to follow how the public defender services for those areas had traditionally
been provided. Mont. Off. St. Pub. Defender, Strategic Plan, http://www.publicdefender.
mt.gov/forms/pdf/proposeddistrictingplanrevised.pdf (accessed Apr. 29, 2007).
182. Mont. Off. St. Pub. Defender, Standards for Counsel Representing Individuals Pur-
suant to the Montana Public Defender Act 1, http://publicdefender.mt.gov/standards.asp
(accessed Nov. 26, 2006) [hereinafter Standards].
183. Id. at 41-42.
184. Id. at 3.
185. Ga. Pub. Defender Stands. Council, Standards, http://www.gpdsc.com/cpdsystem-
standards-main.htm (accessed Apr. 29, 2007).
186. N.C. Ct. Sys. Off. Indigent Def. Servs., Article 39B-Indigent Services Act,
http://www.ncids.org/; select Indigent Defense Services Act (accessed Apr. 29, 2007).
187. See generally Iowa St. Pub. Defender, Rules and Statutes, "Administrative Rules,"
http://spd.iowa.gov/filemgmtlviewcat.php?cid=3 (updated Feb. 7, 2007).
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The Standards make a number of radical changes to how indi-
gent defense services are provided in Montana. The changes be-
gin with initial contact with the client. For clients in custody prior
to initial appearance, the Standards require that attorneys meet
with clients for at least fifteen minutes prior to their first court
appearance.188 This does not mean that counsel will appear on all
cases at initial appearance, but it does mean that everyone in cus-
tody should have the opportunity to briefly talk to a lawyer before
going to court.
The next significant change is in the appointment process. If
a request is made for counsel, the court will appoint OSPD to re-
present the client. This is done before a determination of indi-
gency is made.18 9 OSPD determines indigence, not the court. The
client's indigency questionnaire is not admissible in court except
"when offered for impeachment purposes or in a subsequent prose-
cution of the applicant for perjury or false swearing." 190 In fact,
the court cannot challenge OSPD's determination of indigence.
Only OSPD or the prosecution can contest the issue. 19 '
OSPD can determine that the client is indigent under either
of two alternative bases. First, a client is indigent if his gross
household income is at or below 133% of the current federal pov-
erty guidelines. 92 Second, regardless of the client's household in-
come, a client is indigent if "the disposable income and assets of
the applicant and the members of the applicant's household are
insufficient to retain competent private counsel without substan-
tial hardship to the applicant or the members of the applicant's
household."' 93 OSPD cannot require public defenders or contract
attorneys to perform the indigence determination, but must use
other employees or methods. 94 If OSPD determines that the cli-
ent is not indigent, the client has a right to appeal the decision to
the appointing court.195
The Standards mandate that counsel does not let the client
languish in jail. If the client appears for initial appearance and is
incarcerated, counsel from OSPD is to make contact with the cli-
188. Standards, supra n. 182, at 1.
189. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-8-101 (2005).
190. Id. at § 47-1-111(2)(c).
191. Rios v. Just. Ct., 148 P.3d 602, 604 (Mont. 2006).
192. Mont. Code Ann. § 47-1-111(3)(a).
193. Id. at -111(3)(b).
194. Id. at -111(6)(e); Mont. Off. St. Pub. Defender, Admin. Policies 1-2,
http://www.publicdefender.mt.gov/docs/Policylndigency.pdf (Dec. 6, 2006).
195. Mont. Code Ann. § 47-1-111(1)(d).
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ent within three working days. 196 Counsel is required to maintain
regular contact with clients, "at least weekly unless otherwise
agreed between the client and counsel.' 97 "Counsel [is to] provide
continuous and uninterrupted representation" of the client
through the trial court level; however, absent exceptional circum-
stances, all appeals are now handled by the Office of the Appellate
Defender. 198 The Office of the Appellate Defender is responsible
for investigating and pursuing claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. 199
Initial specific caseload standards have been adopted, and
workload standards are currently under review.200 The Stan-
dards provide a detailed methodology for identifying and deter-
mining conflicts of interest in an effort to avoid conflicts. 201 The
Standards cover most aspects of criminal defense practice, includ-
ing client interviews, 202 pretrial release, 20 3 preliminary hear-
ings,20 4 investigation, 20 5 discovery,20 6 "develop [ing] a theory of the
case,"20 7 pretrial motions, 20 8 plea negotiations, 20 9 trial prepara-
tion,210 all phases of trial,211 and sentencing. 212 The Standards
also address counsel's responsibilities when acting as standby
counsel.213
The Standards have been adopted and are currently undergo-
ing codification for the following: appellate advocacy, sentence re-
view, post-conviction proceedings, representation in Youth Court,
196. Mont. Off. St. Pub. Defender, Standards for Counsel Representing Individuals Pur-
suant to the Montana Public Defender Act 7, http://publicdefender.mt.gov/docs/Com-
pleteStandards.pdf (accessed Nov. 26, 2006) [hereinafter Complete Standards].
197. Id. at 17.
198. Id. at 7.
199. James B. Wheelis was selected as the first Chief Appellate Defender under the new
Public Defender Act. Mont. Off. St. Pub. Defender, Appellate Office, http://publicdefender.
mt.gov/maps/appellate.asp (accessed Feb. 21, 2007).
200. Complete Standards, supra n. 196, at 21.
201. Id. at 8-16.
202. Id. at 23-26.
203. Id. at 26-27.
204. Id. at 27.
205. Id. at 27-28.
206. Complete Standards, supra n. 196, at 28-29.
207. Id. at 29.
208. Id. at 29-30.
209. Id. at 30-34.
210. Id. at 34-35.
211. Id. at 36-41.
212. Complete Standards, supra n. 196, at 41-48.
213. Id. at "Standards for Standby Counsel in Criminal Cases."
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representation in an involuntary mental health commitment,2 14
representation in an involuntary commitment based on serious
developmental disability, representation of a minor voluntarily
committed to a mental health facility, representation of parents in
dependent and neglect proceedings, 215 representation of a respon-
dent in a guardianship or conservatorship proceeding, representa-
tion in proceedings under the Uniform Parentage Act, representa-
tion of parents or a guardian for the involuntary commitment of a
developmentally disabled person, and representation of a respon-
dent in a proceeding for involuntary commitment for alcohol-
ism.2 1
6
Training is a critical component of the new system. The Act
mandates that the Chief Public Defender appoint a statewide
training coordinator. 21 7 The training coordinator will:
a) coordinate training to public defenders in current aspects of
criminal and civil law involving public defense;
b) assist in the development and dissemination of standards, proce-
dures, and policies that will ensure that public defender services
are provided consistently throughout the state;
c) consolidate information on important aspects of public defense
and provide for a collection of official opinions, legal briefs, and
other relevant information;
d) provide assistance with research or briefs and provide other
technical assistance requested by a public defender;
e) apply for and assist in the disbursement of federal funds or other
grant money to aid the statewide public defender system; and
f) perform other duties assigned by the chief public defender. 218
In the first six months of the new public defender system,
OSPD has conducted a leadership conference for the newly hired
regional public defenders, a statewide seminar for all new OSPD
employees and contract attorneys, a statewide seminar for all
OSPD investigators, a "boot camp" for new criminal defense attor-
neys, training for juvenile defenders, and training for mental
214. See generally In re Mental Health of KG.F., 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001) (ruling incor-
porated in the Standards discussing government representation in involuntary mental
health commitments).
215. See generally In re A.S., 87 P.3d 408 (Mont. 2004) (ruling incorporated in the Stan-
dards governing representation in dependency and neglect proceedings).
216. Complete Standards, supra n. 196, at "Representation of a Person Who is the Sub-
ject of a Petition for the Appointment of a Guardian or Conservator"-"Representation of
Persons in a Proceeding to Determine Parentage under the Uniform Parentage Act."
217. Mont. Off. St. Pub. Defender, Central Office, http://mt.gov/govt/statedir/agency/pub-
licdefender.asp (accessed Feb. 21, 2007).
218. Mont. Code Ann. § 47-1-210(3) (2005).
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health commitments. 219 Training will be ongoing, and will be de-
livered through a variety of methods including in-person semi-
nars, videoconferencing, and various media available for dissemi-
nation to the regional offices. 220 Recognizing that there have been
cultural issues in the past between non-Native American attor-
neys and Native American clients, OSPD's first statewide training
included a presentation on increasing cultural competencies in
representing Native American clients.221
Finally, the Public Defender Commission and the Chief Public
Defender continue to solicit public comment on an ongoing basis,
seeking dialogue with the general public and with all segments of
the criminal justice system.222 For Montana's new system to sur-
vive, broad-based support is critical.
V. INDIGENT DEFENSE IN MONTANA'S FEDERAL COURTS
In 1964, Congress enacted the Criminal Justice Act, providing
federal funds to pay attorneys representing indigent criminal de-
fendants in federal court.223 Two years before (in 1962) NLADA
created the National Defender Project using a Ford Foundation
grant.224 The National Defender Project helped fund some of the
first organized federal defender systems in several cities around
the United States.225 In 1971 Congress authorized districts to cre-
ate federal public defender systems.226
219. Mont. Pub. Defenders, Training Information, http://publicdefender.mt.gov/train-
ing.asp (accessed May 5, 2007).
220. Id.
221. OSPD has begun a pilot program to improve communication with Native American
clients in Great Falls. The initial project, funded with a federal grant, involves two native
caseworkers who will be assisting the regional office. Pub. Defender Commn., Public De-
fender Commission Minutes July 31, 2006, http://publicdefender.mt.gov/meetings/docs/
minutesjuly312006.pdf.
222. At the Commission's request, the Chief Public Defender sought approval by the
Governor to create advisory councils in all eleven regions in Montana, but was unsuccessful
in obtaining that approval. Pub. Defender Commn., Public Defender Commission Minutes
Dec. 6, 2006, http://publicdefender.mt.gov/meetings/docs/12062006minutes.pdf. Advisory
councils are authorized pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 2-15-122.
223. Pub. L. No. 988-455, 78 Stat. 552 (1964) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2000)).
224. Lawrence F. Small, Journey with the Law: The Life of Judge William J. Jameson
149 (Rocky Mt. College Press 1984).
225. John J. Cleary, Federal Defender Services: Serving the System or the Client? 58 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 65, 67-68 (1995).
226. Pub. L. No. 91-447, 84 Stat. 916, 919-20 (1970). The law authorizes districts to
create either a federal public defender organization or a community defender organization.
A federal public defender office is an organization organized under the U.S. federal courts
and funded by them. A community defender organization is a free-standing corporation
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Until 1991, all indigent defendants in federal courts in Mon-
tana were appointed attorneys from the private bar. The first
statewide indigent criminal defense system for federal courts in
Montana had its genesis in 1991 when then Chief Judge for the
District of Montana, Paul G. Hatfield, directed U.S. Magistrate
Robert M. Holter to investigate the idea of an organized federal
defender system for the District of Montana. 227 Montana's federal
judges chose to establish a Community Defender Organization, a
private not-for-profit corporation which became the Federal De-
fenders of Montana. 228
The newly formed organization began accepting appoint-
ments in 1993, establishing offices in Great Falls and Billings,
and later that same year in Helena. A Missoula office was added
in 1998.229 The Federal Defenders of Montana currently employs
ten full-time attorneys to handle approximately two-thirds of the
appointed criminal cases in the District of Montana. 230
Criminal Justice Act panel attorneys are responsible for the
remaining one-third of the indigent defense cases. 231 These cases
involve conflicts of interest, or are cases over and above what can
reasonably be handled by staff attorneys. In 1993, the Federal
Defenders of Montana closed sixty cases.232 In 2005, they closed
682 cases, an increase of over 1000% in twelve years. 233
VI. THE MONTANA DEFENDER PROJECT
No discussion of indigent defense in Montana would be com-
plete without mentioning the Montana Defender Project. Mon-
tana, with its vast spaces and small population was an unlikely
candidate to obtain funding for a Defender Project. A number of
circumstances, however, created a synchronicity that allowed the
Defender Project to begin. In 1962, NLADA received a $2.6 mil-
lion grant from the Ford Foundation to create the National De-
that receives federal monies through grants to provide indigent criminal defense services.
Id.
227. E-mail from Anthony Gallagher, Exec. Dir. & C. Fed. Defender of Fed. Defenders of
Mont., to Author, History of the Federal Defenders of Montana Attachment 1 (Sept. 29,
2006) (copy on file with Montana Law Review).
228. Id. at 1-2.
229. Id. at 5.
230. Interview with Anthony Gallagher, Exec. Dir. & C. Fed. Defender of Fed. Defenders
of Mont. (Nov. 1, 2006) (recording on file with Author) [hereinafter Gallagher Interview].
231. 1982 Report, supra n. 139.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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fender Project to "create offices for the defense of indigent cli-
ents."234 A year later, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Gideon v. Wain-
wright, guaranteed the right to counsel to indigent citizens
accused of a felony.235 William J. Jameson, U.S. District Judge for
the District of Montana, joined the Advisory Council of the
NLADA in 1964.236 It was Judge Jameson who first had the idea
of the Defender Project for Montana.
Judge Jameson contacted then Dean Robert E. Sullivan at
The University of Montana School of Law, and encouraged him to
apply for an NLADA Defender Project grant in 1965.237 The Mon-
tana Defender Project was designed to provide a variety of legal
assistance, including,
1) Direct assistance by law students in the defense of indigents who
are accused of felonies or misdemeanors;
2) Direct assistance by law students in the defense of indigent In-
dian defendants and a study in depth of the mechanics of reform
of procedure in Indian tribal courts;
3) Direct assistance to inmates of correctional institutions and post-
conviction remedies;
4) The inauguration of a state-wide program of legal aid in criminal
matters at all levels of jurisdiction and the coordination of efforts
by local bar associations to establish similar programs in the
larger metropolitan areas of the state.
5) The gathering of statistical information for the purpose of secur-
ing reform in criminal law and procedure and the education of
those involved in the process of criminal administration in order
to provide adequacy of representation. 238
The application placed a significant emphasis on the seven In-
dian reservations in Montana and enrolled tribal members resid-
ing off reservation. Based in large part on the impact of the grant
on the legal needs of Montana's tribal members, 239 the Director of
234. Ford Found., Early History, httpJ/www.fordfound.orgtelibrary/documents/5020/
008.cfm (accessed Nov. 22, 2006); Small, supra n. 224 (stating the initial grant amount as
$2.3 million and indicating the amount of the grant was later increased to $4.3 million).
235. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S 335, 343-45 (1963).
236. Small, supra n. 224, at 149.
237. App. from Dean Robert E. Sullivan, U. of Mont. Sch. of Law, Application to the
National. Defender Project of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association for a Grant-
in-Aid to Establish the Montana Defender Project (Sept. 27, 1965) (copy on file with Mon-
tana Law Review).
238. Id. at 2-3.
239.
The main reason we were able to get under this umbrella was that the Ford Foun-
dation hadn't really sponsored anything having to do with the defense of the indi-
gent Native Americans both in tribal courts, in federal courts, and in state courts.
So that factor of the proposal probably was the thing that brought the whole thing
through. The other wing of it was more of an educational thing. Actually the Ford
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NLADA recommended that the grant be approved. 240 The three-
year grant was awarded, and in 1966 Dean Sullivan hired William
F. Crowley, a deputy prosecutor from Lewis and Clark County, to
be the first Director of the Project.241
A year after the Defender Project began operations, the Direc-
tor of NLADA visited Montana to see how the Project was work-
ing. He gave the Defender Project a glowing assessment.242 The
Defender Project used law student interns to achieve its goals and
objectives. Interns conducted interviews with inmates at the
Montana State Prison, investigated cases, offered direct assis-
tance in the tribal courts and, eventually, in the state and federal
courts in Montana.
Ron Waterman was one of the first student directors of the
Defender Project.243 He remembers his first visit to the state hos-
pital at Warm Springs to visit a client who had been sent there
from the state prison:
There's one case that stands out in my mind. This fellow right
now would probably have been defined as someone suffering from
bipolar disease. He was incapable of modifying his conduct to a de-
gree that was acceptable in society. And so he would act out in one
way or another, small petty thefts, but mostly it was just simply
acting out, get arrested, get charged with a crime, and go to Deer
Lodge. In Deer Lodge they recognized that this fellow really wasn't,
Foundation was not that interested in subsidizing law school education, but we did
have an element in the proposal to get out and help the tribal courts and tribal
judges. They were federally sponsored but they had no assistance or help from
anyone. That was how the Defender Project got started.
Interview with William F. Crowley, Former Dir. of the Defender Project (Sept. 22, 2006)
(recording on file with Author) [hereinafter Crowley Interview].
240. Memo from Charles L. Decker, Dir., Natl. Defender Project of NLADA, Comments.
of the Director on the Montana Defender Project Application 7 (Feb. 7, 1966).
241. Crowley Interview, supra n. 239.
242.
To say that I enjoyed the full weekend of activities at your Law School is to put it
modestly. The quality and enthusiasm of your law students are not excelled any
place in the country as far as I know. To have the opportunity to work with them
closely and personally as I did in Missoula is a source of additional inspiration to
me.
I have had no experience in recent years that touched me as deeply as the
conference with your Tribal Judges. The sincerity and common sense of the
Judges are impressive. Their interest in their people and their constructive ap-
proach to their problems certainly warrant our cooperation.
Ltr. from Charles L. Decker, Dir., NLADA, to Dean Robert E. Sullivan, U. of Mont. Sch. of
L. (Apr. 27, 1967) (copy on file with Montana Law Review).
243. Mr. Waterman was with the Defender Project from 1968-1969. Interview with Ron
Waterman, Former Student Dir. of the Defender Project (Sept. 27, 2006) (recording on file
with Author) [hereinafter Waterman Interview]. Crowley recalls that Ron Waterman was
.a real civil rights enthusiast." Crowley Interview, supra n. 239.
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if you will, "a criminal": he was mentally ill. They would bounce
him out of Deer Lodge at that time and they would send him over to
Warm Springs. And actually in the Defender Project, I was the sec-
ond attorney to do the same thing for him. He'd go over to Warm
Springs, and in Warm Springs they didn't have any defined forensic
unit to deal with an individual who was not sent there on a commit-
ment but had been sent over from the prison. So as a consequence
they put him in pretty much a lockdown status. This was in the late
60s when Warm Springs was as close to a snake pit as you could
ever get to .... They'd put him in a padded cell.
And I can remember going over and meeting with my client on
the first occasion to get some of the essential facts to complete the
application for the writ of habeas corpus that we were going to file
in federal court. They brought him in to a padded cell, literally a
room with padded walls, a padded ceiling, and padded floor. And he
was in a straight jacket. His arms were locked behind his back in a
long sleeved jacket, and because this was a confinement room there
were no tables or chairs, we sat on the floor. I completed the inter-
view of him sitting on the floor. And that sort of always stuck with
me.... It was eye-opening to say the least. I can remember sitting
there and interviewing this fellow, this client. He seemed at that
time to be perfectly lucid one way or another and was very, very
competent. He had been through this system, this sort of revolving
door before, it was familiar to him. He simply wanted out. And so
we prepared and filed a petition for habeas corpus, and as I recall
we never even had to go to hearing.... With the filing of the peti-
tion saying it was inappropriate to hold him in this type of confine-
ment, the county basically rolled over and agreed that he could be
released, and he was released. He went through that revolving
door. I think I handled him through the second of three times
through the revolving door. Ultimately his conduct got him in
trouble with somebody up in Great Falls and he was killed, which
was sort of predictable as well. It underscored, and left with me, a
tremendous impression about the inadequacies of the prison sys-
tem.
244
During its first three years, while operating under the
NLADA grant, the Defender Project focused much of its efforts on
assistance to tribal members. 245
The Montana Defender Project's primary efforts toward guarantee-
ing the rights of the indigent Indian defendant in courts other than
the tribal courts have been centered in a full-time summer program
in the federal district court for the eastern district of Montana. Of
the seven Indian Reservations in Montana, five are located in this
judicial district, and the overwhelming majority of Indian offenses
are committed there.24 6
244. Waterman Interview, supra n. 243.
245. William F. Crowley, Defender Project Outlined, 1 Mont. L. Forum No. 2, 5 (1967).
246. Id. at 8.
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During the summer of 1967, one Defender Project law student
worked at the Fort Peck Reservation, two students worked at the
Blackfeet Reservation, and two worked at the Crow Reserva-
tion. 247 Some of the procedures developed by the Defender Project
became national models. 248
Crowley had only been at the Law School for two years when
Governor Forest Anderson requested that Crowley act as his coun-
sel in Helena during the 1969 Legislative Session.249 Professor
David J. Patterson took over the Defender Project in his ab-
sence.250 After the session, Crowley was again asked by Governor
Anderson to assist with the reorganization of state government,
and due to other academic commitments, was never able to return
full-time to the Defender Project. 251
After the NLADA three-year grant expired, the Defender Pro-
ject was kept running for several years with a variety of funding
sources. 25 2 Under the tutelage of Professors Crowley and Patter-
son, the Defender Project was very active, pursuing post-convic-
tion matters, actions to remove detainers, representation of in-
mates at sentence review, and trial and appellate work.25 3 From
1966 until 1978, the Defender Project filed and argued no fewer
than eleven cases before the Montana Supreme Court.25 4
In structure, the Defender Project had two or more student
interns during the summer, who then became student directors
during the school year. For many years, all third-year students
had a least a few cases through the Defender Project.255 The De-
247. Dean Robert E. Sullivan, 13 University of Montana Law School News No. 2 (1967).
248. William A. Spoja, Students Exposed to Criminal Law, 2 Mont. L. Forum No. 2, 5
(1968).
249. Crowley Interview, supra n. 239.
250. Interview with David J. Patterson, Prof., U. of Mont. Sch. of Law (Sept. 28, 2006)
(recording on file with Author) [hereinafter Patterson Interview].
251. Crowley Interview, supra n. 239. Crowley became the Evidence professor when
Russell Smith took the federal bench. According to Crowley, when he took over the course,
Russell Smith had been teaching Evidence "since the mind of man remembered not to the
contrary." Id.
252. Id.
253. Patterson Interview, supra n. 250. The Montana Defender Project appeared in
most of the district courts in Montana, the Montana Supreme Court, federal district courts
in Montana, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court.
254. Gransberry v. State, 423 P.2d 853 (Mont. 1967); Morsette v. Ellsworth, 443 P.2d 28
(Mont. 1968); Spinler v. State, 446 P.2d 429 (Mont. 1968); Campus v. State, 483 P.2d 275
(Mont. 1971); State ex rel. McDonald v. Dist. Ct., 496 P.2d 78 (Mont. 1972); State v.
Heinrich, 509 P.2d 288 (Mont. 1973); Sather v. Crist, 524 P.2d 785 (Mont. 1974); Fitzpatrick
v. Crist, 528 P.2d 1322 (Mont. 1974); State v. McElveen, 544 P.2d 820 (Mont. 1975); Crist v.
Boyd, 560 P.2d 531 (Mont. 1976); In re Davis, 587 P.2d 30 (Mont. 1978).
255. Crowley Interview, supra n. 239.
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fender Project was responsible for the first student practice rule in
1966, which allowed third-year law students to assist inmates in
preparing post-conviction petitions. 256 A 1969 student practice
rule allowed third-year law students to prosecute in justice court
and police courts with attorney supervision. 257 Finally, the 1975
practice rule allowed students to practice in all Montana courts
under the supervision of a licensed attorney.258 The Defender
Project was the forerunner of the clinical program at The Univer-
sity of Montana School of Law.259
The first Defender Project student to benefit from the 1975
Student Practice Rule was Donald W. Molloy, a third-year law
student at the time, and now Chief Judge for the District of Mon-
tana. As a law student, Molloy did initial appearances and felony
sentencings in the Third Judicial District Court before Judge
Boyd.260 Molloy was also the first law student to argue before the
Montana Supreme Court in State v. McElveen.261 McElveen was
arrested in February 1978. The Defender Project investigated his
felony-theft conviction.
His claim was ineffective assistance of counsel both for failure
to investigate and for the attorney's trial conduct. A petition for
post-conviction relief was filed directly in the Montana Supreme
Court.262 The case was argued in November 1975 and the Court
reversed McElveen's conviction on December 30, 1975.263
Molloy learned several lessons from McElveen, including an
appreciation for Shakespeare:
He was a very interesting guy because he quoted Shakespeare all
the time. His favorite Shakespearian drama was The Merchant of
Venice, and he would always be quoting and ask me if I had read
about Portia, and if I had read about this, that or the other thing.
And frankly I hadn't and wasn't much interested in it. Since then
256. Or. at 1, In the Matter of Furnishing Leg. Assist. to Indigent Prisoners (Mont. June
23, 1966) (copy on file with Montana Law Review).
257. Or. at 1-2, In the Matter of Furnishing Leg. Assist. to L. Enforcement Agencies
(Mont. May 9, 1969) (copy on file with Montana Law Review).
258. Or. at 1-8, In the Matter of the Establish. of a Mont. Student Practice Rule, No.
12982 (Mont. Apr. 30, 1975). The Montana Supreme Court amended the Montana Student
Practice Rule in 1991. Or. at 1-2, In the Matter of the Amend. of the Mont. Student Prac-
tice Rule, No. 12982 (Mont. Aug. 31, 1991).
259. Margaret A. (Peggy) Tonon, Beauty and the Beast-Hybrid Prosecution Externships
in a Non-Urban Setting, 74 Miss. L.J. 1043, 1049-50 (2005).
260. Interview with Donald W. Molloy, C.J., U.S. Dist. Ct., Dist. of Mont. (Sept. 18, 2006)
(recording on file with Author) [hereinafter Molloy Interview].
261. State v. McElveen, 544 P.2d 820 (Mont. 1975).
262. Molloy Interview, supra n. 260.
263. Id.
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over the years I have read particularly The Merchant of Venice, and
understand what he was saying, that sometimes it's not only the
letter of the law but also the spirit of the law that has to be taken
into account. It's been something that's struck me, particularly in
the sentencing regime before Booker when I was forced to follow the
literal letter of the law in sentencing people. In so doing I was not
even close to what my understanding of justice was. It was funny
how that play has come to mean much more to me now than it ever
did when I was at the Defenders. 2 64
Molloy also learned the lesson familiar to all practitioners of
indigent criminal defense: "No good deed goes unpunished." After
McElveen's conviction was overturned, the case was sent back to
Lake County for retrial. On investigation, it was learned that the
property at issue was worth less than the felony limit of $150.
McElveen had already served more than six months. He chose to
plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge and receive a sentence of
time served. 265 When McElveen was released from the Lake
County Jail, he contacted Molloy's wife:
He called my wife and threatened her. He wanted money, because
he didn't have any money to live on. He called looking for me and
she said I was over at the Law School. He threatened her, scared
her so bad, she packed up my kids and drove over to the flag football
field. She isn't that kind of person, and she was scared out of her
wits. And so I got a hold of him and explained to him that he
wouldn't exactly want to have me on the other side of him. And that
was the end of our relationship. 26 6
One case from the Defender Project followed Molloy into his
law practice:
One of the criminal cases that I handled when I was practicing
criminal law was a direct consequence of my involvement with the
Montana Defender Project. And in fact I represented that guy
longer than the period I've been on the federal bench: Harold
"Chico" Armstrong. Harold "Chico" Armstrong was convicted down
in Billings of murder and said he didn't do it. I represented him on
his appeal as a law student, and we wrote a way-too-long brief...
and his conviction was affirmed.
I graduate, go down to work for Judge Battin and the next thing
you know there's a habeas corpus petition . . .and its Chico Arm-
strong. It was Rusty Smith that had that case, and I was aware of it
because Judge Battin asked me about it. There's a lawyer down in
Hamilton, Gail Goheen, who took the case and got an emergency
room doctor from Hamilton to review the case and have the habeas
264. Id. (discussing U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)).
265. Carolyn S. Ostby, Student Author, The Right to Effective Trial Counsel: State v.
McElveen, 37 Mont. L. Rev. 387, 399 (1976).
266. Molloy Interview, supra n. 260.
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corpus petition in front of Judge Smith. And this doctor was able to
take the autopsy that had been done in Billings and basically tear it
apart to the point that there was a serious question of whether or
not, according to Judge Smith, that he was guilty. So Judge Smith
ordered him retried.
By that time I'm finished working at Battin's and I'm over with
Judge Anderson at Anderson, Berger, Sinclair and Murphy. And lo
and behold its Judge Wilson, "Chico Armstrong wants you to re-
present him." . . . I represented him along with Mike Whelan and
that case went to trial and then he was convicted.
Chuck Bradley tried the case for the county attorney's office.
We had gone through all of the evidence, all the FBI evidence, there
was something like 164 items of evidence, and if you looked at the
reports, and I went through and just laboriously looked at every re-
port, it would say "spot of blood." Now Bradley was saying that was
blood from the victim. This was before DNA. The FBI report would
say "could be human, could be animal." But when you piled all this
stuff up it looked pretty awful.
But we were making, I thought, pretty good headway until one
thing happened in the course of the trial. When Armstrong was
playing poker with these guys he checked his gun at the bar. And so
Bradley has the gun that he says was the one that was checked at
the bar. And Armstrong's on the stand and Bradley brings the gun
out and says "Is this your gun?" Now instead of saying yes or no,
Armstrong says "Can I see it?" And of course the jury's all sitting
there, he's on the witness stand, and up to this point I thought
things were going OK for us. So Judge Wilson says yes he can see
the gun. Bradley hands it to him, and it's a six shooter and he holds
it up and looks at it, and then spins the cylinder and listens up to
his ear, and he says "That's my gun." And after that I think he was
toast. He was convicted. 26 7
Molloy continued to represent Chico Armstrong for many years as
the case went back up to the Montana Supreme Court on appeal,
and then into the federal courts on a petition for habeas corpus. 268
The 1975 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Bounds v. Smith,269
changed the direction of the Defender Project. In Bounds, the
Court held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to
the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the
preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing
prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law."270 In response to the Bounds deci-
sion, Ratzlaff v. Zanto was filed before Judge Battin in the federal
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
270. Id. at 828.
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district court in Billings.27 1 The plaintiffs alleged that the State of
Montana had not complied with the requirement of Bounds. Rat-
ziaff was resolved in 1977 when the State of Montana agreed to
provide a law library at the state prison, and entered into a con-
tract with The University of Montana School of Law, through the
Defender Project, to provide legal services to inmates in civil
rights claims.272
John McDonald became Director of the Montana Defender
Project in 1977.273 Jeff Renz replaced him in 1993.274 The begin-
ning of the end of the Defender Project occurred in 1996, when the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Lewis v. Casey.27 5 In Lewis, the
Court significantly restricted its ruling in Bounds. In an opinion
written by Justice Scalia, the Court held "Bounds did not create
an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assis-
tance," and "an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury
simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assis-
tance is subpar in some theoretical sense."276 The Court required
a showing that the prisoner "go one step further and demonstrate
that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance
program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim."277
Once the State of Montana understood the import of Lewis, it
chose not to renew the contract with The University of Montana
School of Law concerning the Defender Project. The last contract
expired in 1998, and with the loss of the contract the School of
271. Pl.'s Objections to Def.'s Rev. Plan, Ratzlaffv. Zanto, CV-77-59 (D. Mont. Sept. 26,
1977). The suit was filed by Missoula law firm Smith, Connor, VanValkenberg, and Lar-
rivee. The firm's partners were Paul Smith, John P. Connor, Fred VanValkenberg, and
Noel Larrivee. Id.
272. See Id.; Def.'s Rev. Plan, Ratzlaff v. Zanto, CV-77-59 (D. Mont. Sept. 14, 1977).
273. McDonald Appointed as Civil Rights Director, 11 Mont. L. Forum 1, 8 (1977). Dur-
ing Professor McDonald's tenure, the Montana Defender Project appeared as attorney of
record in two cases before the Montana Supreme Court: Parker v. Crist, 621 P.2d 484
(Mont. 1980); In re Brown, 605 P.2d 185 (Mont. 1980).
274. During Professor Renz's tenure from 1993 to 1998, the Montana Defender Project
appeared as attorney of record in twelve cases before the Montana Supreme Court: State v.
Christensen, 877 P.2d 468 (Mont. 1994); State v. Evans, 899 P.2d 1073 (Mont. 1995); State
v. Docken, 908 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1995); State v. Rice, 910 P.2d 245 (Mont. 1996); State v.
Hardy, 926 P.2d 700 (Mont. 1996); State v. Moorman, 928 P.2d 145 (Mont. 1996); State v.
Finney, 931 P.2d 1300 (Mont. 1997); State v. Wilson, 936 P.2d 316 (Mont. 1997); State v.
Barnhart, 942 P.2d 718 (Mont. 1997); State v. Chastain, 947 P.2d 57 (Mont. 1997); Worden
v. Mont. Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 962 P.2d 1157 (Mont. 1998); State v. Redcrow, 980 P.2d
622 (Mont. 1999).
275. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 341 (1996).
276. Id. at 343, 351.
277. Id. at 351.
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Law disbanded the Defender Project. 278 Molloy expressed his re-
grets over the demise of the Montana Defender Project.
I think it was a mistake for the Legislature to take away the
funding for the Montana Defender Project. I think [the students]
served a great public service in screening and explaining and work-
ing with people who have legitimate claims. 30% of our work here,
30% of the filings in the federal court in Montana are pro se litiga-
tion, and most of that comes out of the Montana State Prison. That
was not the case when the Defender Project was around.
The same statistic holds true at the Ninth Circuit. Almost a
third of the work there is pro se litigation. Now there's a lot more of
theirs that does not involve prisoners, but there's a lot that does
involve prisoners. So when you relegate the importance of the crim-
inal justice system you get to the point, and I'm not saying this in a
totally pejorative sense, but it's like Hannah Arendt and her writ-
ings about the banality of evil. You just become oblivious about the
consequences of processing and locking up and not actually focusing
on what are the underlying issues that give rise to these
problems.... I thought that the Montana Defender Project served a
really, really legitimate purpose, and I benefited greatly from being
a part of it. 2 7 9
The Defender Project had an enormous impact on all facets of
Montana's criminal justice system. 280 Many prominent members
of Montana's legal community were student directors of the De-
fender Project, including Molloy, Hon. Greg Todd (district court
judge for the Thirteenth Judicial District), Hon. Diane Barz (for-
mer district court judge for the Thirteenth Judicial District), Gla-
cier County Attorney Larry Epstein, Neil Ugrin (partner in the
firm of Ugrin, Alexander, Zadick and Higgins), Stuart Kellner
(partner in the firm of Hughes, Kellner, Sullivan and Alke), John
278. Many of the Defender Project's activities, on a significantly smaller scale, are now
conducted by the Criminal Defense Clinic at the School of Law. Professor Jeff Renz is the
Clinical Supervisor for the Criminal Defense Clinic. U. of Mont. School of L., Criminal
Defense Clinic, http://www.umt.edu/law/clinics/crim-defense.htm (accessed Jan. 8, 2007).
279. Molloy Interview, supra n. 260.
280. Two of the most significant pieces of civil litigation in the past fifteen years about
Montana's criminal justice system prominently featured attorneys with connections to the
Defender Project. Ron Waterman, a former student director of the Defender Project, was
the lead plaintiffs attorney in the civil litigation that ensued over the 1991 riot at the
Montana State Prison. Waterman Interview, supra n. 243. Among the lead defense attor-
neys in that case was John Maynard, a former student director of the Defender Project. Id.
Ron Waterman was also the lead attorney for the ACLU in the White v. Martz litigation
that led to the passage of the Montana Public Defender Act. Compl. at 1, White v. Martz,
2006 Mont. Dist. Lexis 136 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Jan. 25, 2006). Among the defense attor-
neys in White v. Martz was Larry Epstein (Glacier County Attorney and student director of
the Defender Project the same year as Donald Molloy), and Fred VanValkenberg (Missoula
County Attorney, former Missoula County Public Defender, one of the attorneys in the Rat-
zlaff litigation, and longtime legislative proponent of indigent defense reform). Id.
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Maynard (partner in the firm of Crowley, Haughey, Hanson,
Toole, and Dietrich), and Ron Waterman (partner in the firm of
Gough, Shanahan, Johnson and Waterman). The history of indi-
gent defense in Montana is intertwined with the history of the De-
fender Project.
VII. "CHANGE IS THE LAW OF LIFE"' 2 8 1
A. The Past
Montana has always had impressive statutes and constitu-
tional provisions that textually mandate effective assistance of
counsel for indigent defendants. The issue has been resource allo-
cation to those tasks. Montana has had tremendous successes
with indigent defense, and it has had shameful failures.
One case that illustrates the critical importance of resources
is State v. Spotted Hawk.28 2 Spotted Hawk, decided 107 years ago,
is still good law in Montana. Spotted Hawk, Little Whirlwind,
and Whirlwind (David Stanley), all members of the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe, were convicted of the murder of John Hoover.
John Hoover was a sheepherder working on a ranch near what
was then the Tongue River Indian Reservation. Stanley was ar-
rested for the murder of Hoover, and confessed that he alone had
killed Hoover. Unsatisfied with the arrest of a single individual,
the authorities pressed the issue until Stanley implicated Spotted
Hawk and Little Whirlwind as his accomplices. Spotted Hawk
was arrested and tried in 1897.283
Spotted Hawk's attorneys, C.L. Merrill and George W. Farr,
put up a vigorous defense, beginning with a motion for a change of
venue. 28 4 They introduced evidence that Stanley had confessed
multiple times to being solely responsible for Hoover's death, in-
troduced credible alibi evidence, and offered testimony indicating
that Stanley was not worthy of belief, all to no avail.28 5 Spotted
281. "For time and the world do not stand still. Change is the law of life. And those who
look only to the past or the present are certain to miss the future." John F. Kennedy,
Speech, Address in the Assembly Hall at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt (Frankfurt,
Germany, June 25, 1963) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
print.php?pid=9303).
282. State v. Spotted Hawk, 55 P. 1026 (Mont. 1899).
283. Orlan J. Svingen, The Case of Spotted Hawk and Little Whirlwind: An American
Indian Dreyfus Affair, 15 W. Historical Q. 281 (1984).
284. The motion was denied. Id. at 289-90.
285. Spotted Hawk, 55 P. at 1031.
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Hawk was arrested, tried, and convicted in 1897; a successful ap-
peal followed that concluded in 1899.286
Spotted Hawk's appeal was argued by former U.S. Senator
Wilbur F. Sanders, and the conviction was reversed based on a
failure to grant a motion to change venue. The facts recited by the
court clearly establish why it was incumbent on the trial judge to
grant the change of venue. 28 7
286. Id. As is the custom for those who inform on others, David Stanley was only con-
victed of manslaughter, and received a five-year sentence. Stanley was never released
from prison, however, as he died of tuberculosis on October 19, 1899. Svingen, supra n.
.283, at 294.
287.
That the people were greatly excited in all parts of the county; that cowboys and
ranchmen to the number of 200 had left their homes, and gathered at a ranch,
near the Cheyenne Indian agency; that these men were armed; that they had
gathered together to force the Indian agent to surrender the murderer of Hoover,
claiming that the murderer was a member of this tribe; that it was their intention,
if the murderer was not surrendered, to go upon the reservation, and exterminate
the tribe; that they, in furtherance of this object, gathered ammunition and rifles
from Miles City and Eastern cities; that cartridges and rifles were sent to them
from other parts of the county; that they were only persuaded from attacking the
Indians by the civil authorities of the county; that the sheriff was compelled to
leave deputies in charge of them to restrain them; that this condition arose from
the fact that the people believed that the Cheyenne Indians killed Hoover; that
bitterness against the Indians extended to all parts of the county, and existed at
the time of the trial; that, at the time of the burial of Hoover, a large number of
men took an oath that they would be present at the trial of Hoover's murderers,
and, if they were acquitted, they would take the law into their own hands, and not
allow them to leave the court room; that they would be avenged upon the court and
counsel in case of acquittal; and that the excitement was so great that the military
authorities sent several companies of soldiers to prevent an outbreak. It further
recites that the papers in Custer county, all of general circulation, denounced the
Indians, unduly exciting the inhabitants, and prejudicing them against the Indi-
ans, including the defendant; that about 40 families removed from the agency to
Miles City, to get protection from the threatened danger, and remained there sev-
eral weeks; and that, since the finding of the body of Hoover, there had been un-
friendly talk against him, the people of Custer county holding him in utter con-
tempt. In many respects these statements are strongly corroborated by the evi-
dence of Huffman and Gibb, set out above; and there is nothing to contradict them
except the affidavit of the county attorney, Porter, made upon information and
belief, and that of Sheriff Gibb. The former specifically denies only one fact, even
upon information and belief. It denies that any number of men took any vow or
oath to be present at the trial and take the law into their own hands, or threatened
to hang or do any injury to the court or counsel of the defendant. Sheriff Gibb
states that it was never at any time necessary to put any cowboys or settlers in
charge of deputies to keep them from attacking the Indians. Huffman found ex-
citement in almost all parts of the county he visited. The people were talking of
the murder and the Indian excitement wherever he stopped, with a few exceptions.
There was strong prejudice in the minds of the people, and they were ready to stop
work and go upon a movement against the Cheyennes if further trouble occurred.
The settlers were generally arming themselves and getting ammunition. He saw
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On remand, the trial court had the option to retry Spotted
Hawk or dismiss the charges. On his deathbed, Stanley recanted
his statements implicating Spotted Hawk and Little Whirlwind.
Stanley's wife came forward and acknowledged that he had also
confessed to her his sole responsibility for the death of Hoover. All
charges were dismissed, and Spotted Hawk was freed.288
One may question how three court-appointed attorneys (two
in Miles City and one in Helena), operating on an eventual pay-
ment of $50 to be split three ways, 28 9 were able to accomplish such
a task. The answer is simple; they were not all court-appointed
attorneys. The two local attorneys, C.L. Merrill and George W.
Farr, were court-appointed. The appellate attorney, Wilbur F.
Sanders, was hired through the financial assistance of the Indian
Rights Association of Philadelphia.290 For the appeal alone, Sand-
arms and ammunition forwarded. Gibb found excitement near the agency. One
man wanted to go and fight the Indians, because he thought the killing of Hoover
and the stealing of cattle should be more speedily and adequately punished. This
statement was made to him while the discussion of the possibility of getting a jury
was had. While he says that he put no cowboys or settlers in charge of deputies,
he does make it clear that he deemed the matter of so much importance, and the
danger to the people so imminent from a threatened outbreak of the Indians, that
he put near the agency four deputies from different parts of the county, with the
purpose that they might warn the people of their particular localities of any com-
ing danger. He himself spent five weeks' time either at the agency, or in going to
or returning therefrom, in his attempt to secure the arrest of the Indians charged
with the murder, and in looking out that the inhabitants were informed of any
threatened danger. The newspaper clippings introduced at the hearing are of no
value whatever as evidence of the facts and statements set forth in them; but,
mindful of the hereditary enmity and antipathy existing between the whites and
the Indians wherever they have lived in proximity with each other in this Western
country; mindful, also, of the fact, which is a matter of history, that there have
during recent years been troubles between the whites and the Indians in various
parts of the country,-the fact that these publications were made during a period
of five weeks, extravagant and inflammatory in their character, would lead one to
believe that the readers of them would be more or less excited by the statements
contained in them. It is abundantly apparent, also, that an outbreak of hostilities
between the whites and Indians was threatened at this time, over the murder of
Hoover. We think that, upon the whole showing, whatever opinion might be enter-
tained regarding the sources of information of the defendant upon which he bases
his statements in his affidavit, sufficient appears therefrom to impel this court to
the conclusion that the lower court should have granted the defendant's petition.
If these statements of the defendant were not true, it could easily have been shown
that they were not. They are not seriously controverted.
Spotted Hawk, 55 P. at 1031-32.
288. Svingen, supra n. 283, at 294.
289. Mont. Penal Code § 1892 (1895).
290. Svingen, supra n. 283, at 291.
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ers was paid an amount ten times that paid to Merrill and Farr for
defending the case through sentencing. 291
It was the infusion of funds at the right time that allowed jus-
tice to prevail in that case.292 Resources almost always tell the
tale in indigent defense. Contrast the result for Spotted Hawk's
co-defendant, Little Whirlwind, who was represented at trial by
George R. Milburn. 293 Millburn, a Miles City attorney, was court-
appointed. He had previously "spearheaded an effort by citizens
of southeastern Montana Territory to remove the Northern
Cheyennes from their reservation and to reopen its valuable graz-
ing lands to the public domain." 294 Millburn did not file a bill of
exceptions, and failed to perfect and appeal the venue issue that
resulted in Spotted Hawk's exoneration. Little Whirlwind's ap-
peal failed and his conviction was affirmed. 295
B. The Present
Resources again tell the tale in the recent case of Jimmy Ray
Bromgard. Bromgard was released after spending over fifteen
years in the Montana State Prison for sexual offenses he did not
commit. Bromgard's court-appointed counsel did not conduct suf-
ficient pre-trial investigation, file pre-trial motions, challenge the
State's flimsy forensic evidence, try to suppress Bromgard's iden-
tification, give an opening statement at trial, prepare a closing
statement for trial, or properly pursue or preserve Bromgard's ap-
pellate rights.296
Bromgard was freed due to the tireless effort of his court-ap-
pointed appellate counsel, William Hooks of Helena. Hooks took
291. Id. at 295; Ch. 33, 1903 Mont. Laws 46-47.
292. It was the infusion of funds that led to the reversal of the convictions in Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). It was not the indigent defense system that provided Powell
with an adequate appeal and argument before the Court. The indigent defense system had
given Powell over. It was the International Labor Defense (the legal arm of the Communist
Party) that paid for Powell's appeal and subsequent retrials. Michael J. Klarman, Powell
v. Alabama- The Supreme Court Confronts "Legal Lynchings" in Criminal Procedure Stories
1, 5-8 (Carol S. Steiker ed., Found. Press 2006).
293. Svingen, supra n. 283, at 292.
294. Id. at 292 n. 16.
295. State v. Little Whirlwind, 56 P. 820 (Mont. 1899). Little Whirlwind was eventually
pardoned in 1901, due in large part to the efforts of the Indian Rights Association. Sv-
ingen, supra n. 283, at 294-95.
296. The Innocence Project, Jimmy Ray Bromgard, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
case/display-profile.php?id=111 (accessed Jan. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Innocence Project,
Bromgard].
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Bromgard's case to the Montana Supreme Court three times. 297
Even though he lost all three times, he never gave up the case or
his client's cause. He was able to associate the Innocence Pro-
ject 298 with the defense, and ultimately, with its assistance and
resources, exonerate Jimmy Ray Bromgard.299 The legal history
of Jimmy Ray Bromgard includes both the worst and the best of
Montana's former system of indigent defense.
Although indigent defense in Montana has come a long way
since 1864, other issues remain, including the continuing lack of
resources. There is also the issue of how Montana's Indian citi-
zens fare in Montana's criminal justice system. Native Americans
comprise approximately 6.4% of Montana's population.300 In Mon-
tana's state prisons, however, they comprise 16.7% of the male
population and 25.9% of the female population.30 1 As significant
as these racial disparities appear, in reality they underrepresent
the problem. Most crimes prosecuted against Native Americans
in Montana are not prosecuted in state courts; they are either
prosecuted in tribal courts 30 2 or in federal courts. Native Ameri-
cans convicted in tribal and federal courts are often sentenced to
tribal or federal prisons, not the state prison system.30 3
297. State v. Bromgard, 862 P.2d 1140 (Mont. 1993); State v. Bromgard 901 P.2d 611
(Mont. 1995); State v. Bromgard, 948 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1997).
298. Innocence Project, About the Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
about (accessed Jan. 8, 2007). The Innocence Project is a non-profit legal clinic at the Ben-
jamin N. Cardozo School of Law. It only takes cases in which post-conviction DNA testing
of evidence may conclusively prove innocence. There is an extensive screening process to
determine eligibility of a claim of innocence. Id.
299. Id.
300. U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quickfacts: Montana, http://quickfacts.cen-
sus.gov/qfd/states/30000.html (June 8, 2006).
301. For the period of time between 1997 and 2006, Native American males admitted to
Montana's prison system comprised between 15.1% and 18.4% of Montana's male prison-
ers. Brian Schweitzer & Mike Ferriter, Montana Department of Corrections Biennial Re-
port H-5 (Dept. of Corrects. 2007) (copy on file with Montana Law Review). During that
same period of time Native American females admitted comprised between 24.9% and 30%
of Montana's female prisoners. Id. at 1-5.
302. All misdemeanors committed on the seven reservations by enrolled tribal members
are prosecuted in the tribal courts. "The tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over non-major
crimes committed by Indians against Indians in Indian Country. Such crimes are specifi-
cally excepted from the jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts by the General
Crimes Act." William C. Canby, American Indian Law in a Nutshell 170 (4th ed., West
Group 2004) (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000)).
303. All felonies committed on six of the seven reservations by enrolled tribal members
are prosecuted in Federal court. The one exception is the Flathead Reservation where fel-
ony crimes committed by enrolled tribal members are prosecuted in state court under the
auspices of Public Law 280. Mickale Carter, Regulatory Jurisdiction on Indian Reserva-
tions in Montana, 5 Pub. Land L. Rev. 147, 157-58 (1984) (providing explanation ofjuris-
dictional authority created under Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953)).
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Tribal courts in Montana provide a unique blend of tradi-
tional Native practices filtered through Anglo concepts of due pro-
cess. The protections of the Bill of Rights, including the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution, do not apply in tribal courts.30 4
The Indian Civil Rights Act determines the rights of tribal mem-
bers prosecuted in a tribal court.30 5
There are also problems with taking tribal court criminal pro-
ceedings and recognizing them for other purposes outside the tri-
bal setting. As a result, in the tribal courts there is no right to
court-appointed counsel under the Indian Civil Rights Act for
those indigent individuals charged with crimes. In the seven tri-
bal court systems in Montana, only the Flathead Tribal Court pro-
vides counsel. 30 6 Some of the other tribal jurisdictions offer lay
advocates, but some cannot afford even lay advocates.
Tribes have the right to establish their court systems, and
provide counsel or not as they deem appropriate. If the conse-
quences of uncounseled convictions were only tribal consequences
then this may be equitable. The reality is, however, that there are
now both state and federal consequences to uncounseled tribal
court convictions, and most tribal governments simply do not have
the resources to provide counsel to those charged with crimes.
Under State v. Spotted Eagle,30 7 uncounseled tribal court con-
victions for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) can be
used as a basis to file a subsequent felony DUI prosecution in
state court in Montana. 308 Uncounseled tribal court convictions
can now also be used in federal court as a basis to file several fed-
eral felony charges. 30 9 In 2005, Senator John McCain introduced
an amendment to the Violence against Women Act that allows un-
counseled tribal court convictions to be the basis of a subsequent
federal felony prosecution. 310
304. U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1978).
305. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000).
306. CSKT Ls. Codified, §§ 1-2-401(2), 2-2-504 (2000) (available at http:I
www.CSKT.org/documents/laws-codified.pdf).
307. State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239 (Mont. 2003).
308. Id. at 1245-46.
309. Id. at 1244-45.
310. U.S. Sen. John McCain, McCain Introduces Safety to Indian Women Act, http:/!
mccain.senate.gov/press-office/view-article.cfm?id=174 (accessed Apr. 30, 2007); 18 USC
§ 117 (2000). The Safety to Indian Women Act provides:
(a) In general.-Any person who commits a domestic assault within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or Indian country
and who has a final conviction on at least 2 separate prior occasions in Federal,
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Congress has also recently passed the Adam Walsh Child Pro-
tection and Safety Act of 2006 (Adam Walsh Act).311 The Adam
Walsh Act creates a federal sex offender registry that, in part, re-
quires registration for those convicted in tribal court of specified
sexual offenses; failing to register is a federal felony offense. The
Adam Walsh Act requires registration even if the tribal court con-
viction was obtained without the assistance of counsel.
C. The Future
Where indigent defense will go in the future in Montana is an
open question. Many of the leaders in Montana's criminal justice
community are optimistic, while others are skeptical.
Although complimentary of the indigent defense systems now
in place in Montana, Molloy expressed his regrets that many
members of the local bar no longer participate in indigent criminal
defense and therefore do not see what is occurring in the criminal
justice system.
First of all, they don't know what's going on with the policy of
our law. And secondly, particularly when the sentencing guidelines
were mandatory, it would astound you how unfair occasionally the
application of that was. I think that only when you have people who
are leaders in the community, the country club people, who under-
stand the unfairness of it, are you ever going to get a reasoned de-
bate about what is the purpose of the criminal justice system.
What are we trying to do? Are we going to be enlightened like
the nineteenth century and at least try to make some effort at reha-
bilitation of people, or are we going to continue to lock people up?
And since I've been on the bench, as you know, there were 68,000
people in the federal prison system in 1996. There are over 200,000
now. We lock up more people than any nation in the world. We've
State, or Indian tribal court proceedings for offenses that would be, if subject to
Federal jurisdiction-
(1) any assault, sexual abuse, or serious violent felony against a spouse or inti-
mate partner; or
(2) an offense under chapter 110A, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned
for a term of not more than 5 years, or both, except that if substantial
bodily injury results from violation under this section, the offender shall be
imprisoned for a term of not more than 10 years.
(b) Domestic assault defined.-In this section, the term "domestic assault" means
an assault committed by a current or former spouse, parent, child, or guardian
of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a
person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the victim as a
spouse, parent, child, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a
spouse, parent, child, or guardian of the victim.
18 USC § 117 (emphasis added).
311. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 602 (2006).
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got over two million people in state, federal and local jails. And our
schools are running out of money. We have more problems because
we don't have the kinds of things we need for education. For at least
my perspective, there's a cause and effect relationship. When you
don't have opportunity you resort to other things. When you resort
to other things, generally, the quick buck means you're going to get
involved in criminal activity and it just becomes a vicious cycle
312
Randi Hood, Montana's first Chief Public Defender, has al-
ready faced numerous obstacles in setting up a statewide indigent
defense system. She remains optimistic given what she has seen
in her thirty-plus years as a public defender.
In 1977 you were totally on your own. When I got asked to be a
public defender I had no idea what I was doing. There were older
attorneys that made themselves available to question, but it was
almost like learning how to do it by doing it. We were totally on our
own; there was nobody else to rely upon. There was nobody to say
"Here's what you ought to do," or "Here's standards for what ought
to be done." And that's been true all the way through. Now it's dif-
ferent. There are people to rely upon, there's more resources,
there's standards that say "Here's how you do this." Those are the
big differences ....
The first day I showed up at Administration [to start as Mon-
tana's first Chief Public Defender] all I had was a desk. I didn't
have a telephone or a computer. And I sort of sat there thinking,
"What now?" There were some nay-sayers around me who would
say "You're never going to find the attorneys to populate the system
the way you want to do it," or "You're never going to be able to get
this system up and running in a mere eight months." There were
times I had a couple of doubts about those things, but it's worked.
I think that we will be even better off in five years. We will
have shown that this system can really fight for people, we will have
made prosecutors more honest. I don't mean that they lie, but that
they really look at their cases before they file them because they
know that they are going to be up against somebody who's going to
question what's been done, if it should be questioned.... We really
consider this a new day for criminal defense work in Montana.3 13
James B. Wheelis, Chief Appellate Defender, has been a pri-
vate attorney, a district judge, a legal services attorney, a prosecu-
tor, and an appellate attorney in the Attorney General's office.
From his perspective, indigent defense reforms have been central
to the progressive evolution of our legal system.
312. Molloy Interview, supra n. 260.
313. Interview with Randi Hood, C. Pub. Defender for Mont. (Nov. 1, 2006) (recording on
file with Author).
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Now there's more of a demand that there be coherent stan-
dards, more money, everything's being pushed towards a standard
that really replicates what a person with an ample bank account
would be able to purchase as far as representation. There are still
real limits on money and time and all the rest of it, but the differ-
ence is incredible....
If it weren't for the public defender system then really signifi-
cant rights in the culture would go untended. When you look at the
major cases that have defined personal rights, they're not brought
on behalf of exemplary people. Gideon v. Wainwright, for instance,
who was the petitioner in that case? It wasn't someone who was a
Boy Scout leader.... What I have seen is that if the [public defend-
ers] weren't there then the system basically went to hell because
there was no back pressure. The inherent bullying that the system
has, that is, the pressure to get things done, the irritation with the
people who are obstacles, goes unchecked and it tends to get worse
and worse .... I think Gideon v. Wainwright, Miranda, and so on
have saved the legal system. It's a bitter pill for people in power
often, but it's basically made them perform. 3 14
Chief Justice of the Montana Supreme Court, Karla Gray,
shares Ms. Hood's optimism about the future of indigent defense
in Montana:
I'm very hopeful. I'm very optimistic. The only caution that I
concern myself with is appropriate resourcing from the Legislature.
Having gone through a "not terrific" couple of sessions on those
when indigent defense was ostensibly under the Court after State
assumption, I know the rigors of trying to get adequate resourcing
and that's my only caution. I think that the new system is vision-
ary. I think the legislators that were the chief architects were vi-
sionary. I think it is a model that, as you know, is being looked at in
other states as something they could take and then re-tweak in
other jurisdictions. I think the Montana system is sort of state of
the art at the moment, and the resourcing and the funding will be
the making or breaking of it as is true of all these kinds of major sea
changes. But I'm very optimistic.... We're going to have a system
of indigent defense that will not only provide for the needs of those
entitled to court-appointed counsel in those categories of cases, but
a system to really be proud of .... The Legislature should be very
proud of what they did with that bill. The Commission ended up
being constituted of an extraordinarily talented group of people in
my view, really interested in this area. The selection of Randi
[Hood] and then Jim [Wheelis] were just outstanding choices. So I
just keep wishing it well and knowing that it will be well.3 15
314. Interview with James B. Wheelis, Chief App. Defender (Nov. 15, 2006) (recording
on file with Author) (discussing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Miranda v.
Ariz., 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
315. Interview with Karla Gray, C.J. of Mont. Sup. Ct. (Nov. 6, 2006) (recording on file
with Author).
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Anthony Gallagher, Executive Director of the Federal Defend-
ers of Montana, shares both Chief Justice Gray's fiscal concerns
and her optimism about indigent defense in Montana:
I think that the future of indigent defense is always subject to
our funding source.... It's always a fight to make sure that we are
adequately funded and that our panel attorneys are adequately paid
and that there are resources available to panel attorneys that pro-
tect the rights of our clients. That's the one fear I have with the
Montana state system. I think that in theory it's excellent, in the-
ory it's going to work out very well. But if decisions have to be made
because of money, because of the lack of money, or because of pres-
sure from the Legislature that certain expenditures should not be
made, then I think that the promise of Gideon will not be fulfilled.
Whether it be state, federal, or tribal, the attorneys who accept
court appointments are not there because they're going to become
famous, and they're certainly not going to become rich. Those folks
seek a higher level of professional satisfaction, representing the peo-
ple who most need legal representation. They have a core desire to
protect the poor, and these lawyers shield against the infringement
of our protections. And in reality they protect everybody.
I think there was an early 1990s study by the Center for State
Courts that found the emergence of a corps of attorneys dedicated to
indigent defense is the most important contemporary development
in the American legal system, and I think that's true for Montana.
Despite a common perception that government- funded criminal
lawyers are an obstacle to the path of law enforcement efforts, in
truth what we do is make the police and the prosecution do it right.
We fight daily to uphold the Constitution-I think that is what we
really do even though the public doesn't see it. People who are dedi-
cated to this function maintain the public's confidence and the na-
tion's commitment to equal justice under the law. In some small
way, we, those who do this on a regular basis, act as the conscience
of the nation. We ensure the successful operation of the constitu-
tionally-based adversary system of justice by which both criminal
laws and the fundamental rights of all are enforced. 3 16
VIII. DA CAPo AL FINE
One hundred forty-two years of the history of indigent defense
in Montana have been written since Montana became a territory.
Significant progress has been made, and many challenges remain
to be resolved. Policy decisions need to be made on an ongoing
basis about the funding of Montana's system of indigent defense.
The new system must now implement the practice standards that
have been promulgated and build a larger support base. The indi-
316. Gallagher Interview, supra n. 230.
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gent defense system, the State Bar, the Montana Legislature, and
the courts must consider the cause of the disproportionate incar-
ceration of Montana's Native American citizens. Both the Mon-
tana Legislature and Congress must consider the propriety of con-
tinuing to use uncounseled tribal court convictions to enhance
state and federal prosecutions. These issues and more remain.
The cause of indigent defense is not a struggle that can be
fought once and won; it is the continuing struggle to seek justice.
Delegate Joseph K. Toole at Montana's 1889 Constitutional Con-
vention understood the ongoing nature of the task. To his ques-
tion, "How often shall the accused have counsel, and where?" 317 it
is hoped that we will continue to respond, "This question answers
itself."
317. Supra n. 32.
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